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“As a Union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world’s 
Gross National Product (GNP), the European Union is inevitably a global player […] it 
should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better 
world”   (European Security Strategy :1).       
  
The focus and aim of this thesis is to explain the mechanisms that lead to a change in 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) after September 11th 2001. Since ESDP 
was declared operational in Laeken in December 2001 there have been several changes 
which in sum seem to indicate that the EU now has the tools and the capabilities to act 
as a security policy actor on its own. The treaty of Nice, which was implemented in 
2003, provided ESDP with new agencies and institutions. In 2003, the Berlin plus 
agreement was finalised which gave the EU access to NATO’s assets and capabilities. 
In December 2003 the creation of the European Security Strategy (ESS) arrived as an 
historical event, being the first security doctrine for a supranational organisation. 
Earlier that year the EU had launched its first two military missions and two 
international police missions with a high degree of success. In February 2004 France, 
Britain and Germany decided to pursue the initiative from the ESS by constructing the 
so-called battle groups concept within the frame of ESDP. In June 2004 the European 
Council (EC) signed the Constitutional treaty which contained new provisions for 
ESDP, among others the clauses maintaining collective defence clause and solidarity. 
The EC also decided to create a European Defence Agency (EDA), whose main task 
would be to improve European defence capabilities in the field of crisis management. 
A final example of the latest development has been the EU take-over of the 
Stabilisation Force (SFOR) from NATO in Bosnia Herzegovina (BiH) in December 
2004, where the organisation is now responsible for 7.000 troops under the name 
European Force (EUFOR). 
  
What explains this change of EU Security Policy? Is there a connection between this 
change and US unilateralism after 9/111, or is the change in security policy merely a 
product of the integration process?  
                                                 
1 For the simplicity of not repeating the date “September 11th 2001”, I have decided to use “9/11” as an abbreviation. 
 3
1.1 Research questions 
Much research in the field of security policy and European integration has been 
focused on who the most important actors are and whether it is the member states or 
the supranational institutions that influence most heavily decision making processes 
and the evolution of the EU. In this thesis I will try to focus on the variables I believe 
to be the most significant in determining the direction of ESDP. It is my conviction 
that explanations of ESDP draw upon assumptions from two opposing vantage points. 
The contrast is conspicuous in attempts to explain the post-9/11 changes in ESDP 
referred to above. According to the first approach, the expansion of ESDP can be 
explained with the structural change in the international political system which 
occurred after 9/11, with US foreign policy taking on a more aggressive and unilateral 
guise. The second approach is that the change of ESDP is a result of path dependency 
and spill-over in the integration process.  
The research questions for this thesis are:  
“What explains the change of European Security and Defence Policy after 
September 11th 2001? To what extent can neo-realism or institutional theory 
explain this change?”   
In order to answer these questions it may be useful to present the US unilateral foreign 
and security policy after 9/11 2001 and the path dependency and spill-over in the 
integration process within the EU as independent variables, and changes within ESDP 
after 9/11 2001 as the dependent variable. Determining the relative explanatory weight 
of the two independent variables is a major objective of the thesis. 
 US unilateral foreign and  
 security policy 
Changes in ESDP after 
         September 11th 2001 
 Spill-over and path dependency       
 in the integration process 
 
September 11th 2001 changed the world in many ways and became a turning point in 
the relationship between Europe and the US. First of all it was the date of the terrorist 
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attacks in the United States of America. The attack was the first on American soil 
since Pearl Harbour in 1941, and the first on mainland America since the 19th century. 
Second, it changed US foreign policy in a new unilateral direction: 
 
“If we are an arrogant nation the world would resent us [...] but if we’re a humble nation, but 
strong, they will welcome us”    (George W. Bush in October 2000)2. 
 
“You are either with us, or against us […]”  (George W. Bush in November 2001)3. 
 
On the 12th of September 20014 the NATO countries decided unanimously for the first 
time to use article V of the treaty, the countries of Europe perceiving the attack as an 
assault on alliance territory. Immediately after 9/11 Europe and America were united 
in an almost unprecedented fashion. However, something changed dramatically in the 
following period. Somehow, the new foreign and security policy of the US seemed to 
aggravate relations between the US and Europe as the former waged its “war on 
terrorism”. As a result of the unilateral American doctrine, NATO allies disagreed 
openly for the first time since the dissolution of the Warsaw pact and the transatlantic 
relationship was at its worst in decades. Europe and America seemed to drift apart 
almost sixty years after the Second World War. Seemingly, the terrorist attack and its 
political and international consequences had laid bare two diverging perspectives on 
the conduct of foreign policy, originating from separate sides of the Atlantic: 
 “On the all-important question of power, the efficacy of power, the morality of power, the 
desirability of power – Americans and Europeans perspectives are diverging […] Americans 
are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus” (Kagan:2003:3). 
 
Despite the supposedly isolating effect of American unilateralism since 9/11, many 
scholars will argue that this is not the primary reason behind efforts to forge a common 
foreign and security policy in the EU. Rather, developments within ESDP follow from 
the integration process itself, as captured in the neo-functionalist term of “an ever 
closer union” (Haas:1958). Although American policy after 9/11 and especially the 
case of Iraq added much to the ideological cleavage between the US and Europe 
                                                 
2 From a speech held during the election campaign in 2000 (Bush:2000). 
3 From a speech held on November 5, 2001 (Bush: 2001b). 
4 According to Thune (2003) and Melby (2004) at this same date it was suggested by Defence Secretary Rumsfeld and Vice 
Secretary Wolfowitz at a meeting in the National Security Council that the US should attack Iraq as a response to the terrorist 
attacks, and that this policy after a while took over as official White House policy. 
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(Kagan:2003:11), the ESDP in itself must be seen independently, as a result of an 
internal integration process in which spill-over and path dependency provide the 
driving forces. Put in other words, the change in EU security policy would probably 
have occurred regardless of the structural change in the international political system. 
 
1.2 Hypotheses 
There need not be a contradiction between the external and internal factors assumed to 
have generated the changes in ESDP. In fact, it may be believed that both these factors 
have played an important role. However, it is the aim and purpose of this paper to 
evaluate which theory is the most fruitful in explaining the change and development of 
ESDP, thus contributing to theory elaboration. 
The first hypothesis is H1: The change in ESDP is a result of the need for power 
balance in the international political system.  
There are many implications and conditions underlying this hypothesis. The first 
implication suggests that the new security agenda of the EU was formulated in an 
effort to counter-balance the powerful position of the US. The second implication is 
that the great powers of Europe allow or wish the EU to play a role in security policy. 
The hypothesis is based on a neo-realist perspective on how states react to changes in 
the structure; notably, they will seek to maximize their own interests by forming a 
counter-balance to a sole superpower, especially when the latter opts for unilateralism. 
 
The alternative hypothesis is H2: The change in ESDP is a product of a further and 
deeper integration in the EU as a result of spill-over and path dependency.   
There are also some implications to this hypothesis. Its terminology draws on a hybrid 
of neo-functionalism (NF) and historical institutionalism (HI) which in this thesis I 
have referred to as institutional theory. The creation and deepening of integration in 
one sector creates pressure for further integration within that sector, creating a spill-
over effect that has led to the forming of institutions and treaty-based agreements 
beyond the original intent. Limited information and knowledge about future 
consequences lead to un-intended consequences and spill-over; this in turn has brought 
the integration process from the economic sector to the security policy sector. When 
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the treaty agreements have been implemented and institutions formed, this has led to a 
further spill-over effect within the areas of security policy. The development and 
evolution of ESDP could just as well have occurred without any external crisis. It is 
the deepening and length of the integration process combined with the legacy of path 
dependency from former decisions that explain the change in ESDP. 
 
1.3 The EU as a security policy actor? 
“ […] European integration has proved to be the enemy of European military power, and, 
indeed, of an important European goal”  (Kagan:2003:65) 
 
“The European Union has always been about security policy, but in an indirect fashion” 
(Matlary:2003:105). 
 
The question of whether the EU actually is a security policy actor was debated 
throughout the late 1990s and into the early years of the millennium. The answer to 
this question is dependent on how we define the concept of security. In order to 
understand the role of the EU in security policy it is necessary to use a broad definition 
of the security concept (Barth Eide:2003:309). Following the end of the Second World 
War, it was common to understand security as equivalent to territorial defence against 
military threats (Rieker:2004:13). Karl Deutsch (1957) undertook a different approach 
to the concept of security, choosing the term “security community” to conceptualise 
the integration process in Europe. Integration was defined as a condition where war as 
dispute settlement between nation states becomes obsolete. One of the main purposes 
behind the integration process has always been to create security (Dedman:1996). 
Successful integration is about the radical reduction in the likelihood of states using 
violent means to resolve their differences (Rosamond:2000:42-45). Despite the 
attempts of a constructivist debate about security, the dominance of realist and neo-
realist theories in the decades that followed strengthened the uni-dimensional military 
and state-centric view of the concept. Following the end of the Cold War and the fall 
of communism, however, the security threat had to be totally revised. As the former 
enemy was now becoming a democratic friend, an immediate security threat to the 
Western hemisphere within the traditional understanding of the security concept no 
longer existed. Important and new research highlighted the significance of this 
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change5. Security was now defined not only as territorial defence and military security, 
but was given a broader reference to five different types of security: military, 
economic, societal, political and environmental. The idea was that all variables which 
were basic to the security of the state should be interpreted as a part of the security 
concept. To meet those critics who claimed that this broadening of the concept made it 
useless as all matters of state became a security issue, Buzan & Wæver (2003) used the 
terms “securitisation” and “de-securitisation”. The argument was, for example, that if 
the EU saw migration from Africa as a threat to security, it became securitised, and de-
securitised when it was no longer a threat.  As matters of security not only seemed to 
be the problems of one state, but were very often a regional problem, the concept 
security complex was applied, defined as: 
“A set of units whose major processes of securitisation, de-securitisation, or both are so 
interlinked that their security problems cannot be analysed or resolved apart from one 
another” (Buzan & Wæver:2003:44)6.  
 
National security is closely linked to regional stability, thus regional stability and 
integration is inter-linked. The security complex of Europe can either be integrated or 
more fragmented. As the EU is the only multilateral organisation capable of hindering 
fragmentation, it will remain the most important organisation for security policy in 
Europe (Rieker & Ulriksen:2003:18). If we define security as something more than 
just military power or military capabilities, the EU has undoubtedly been a security 
policy actor since Maastricht. With the latest military developments in the ESDP and 
the forming of ESS and the different institutions, even traditional realist scholars 
would most likely agree that the EU is a security policy actor. However, the main 
problem of regarding the EU as such an actor is the fact that the EU is neither a state 
nor an international institution. It is a supranational organisation of sovereign member 
states, and the first of its kind. This sometimes makes it difficult to use traditional tools 
in the analysis of the organisation and how this phenomenon may be approached. 
Although the EU fulfils all the great-power criteria of Kenneth Waltz (1993)7, the EU 
                                                 
5 In “Security-a new framework for analysis” (Buzan et al:1998) gave the concept of security a broader understanding. 
6 At first Buzan used this definition of security complex : “A group of states whose primary security link together sufficiently 
closely that their national security cannot realistically be considered apart from one another “ (Buzan et al.:1991:106) 
7 Conditions for becoming a great power: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military 
strength, political stability and competence (Waltz:1993). 
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is not a Weberian state. Devoid of police, army and a significant intelligence capacity, 
it is far from the necessary resources to act as a traditional great power 
(Moravscik:2005:19). According to Adler & Barnett (1998) this strange hybrid 
between a federal state and an international organisation corresponds to what they call 
“a tight coupled security community”, lifting the security community concept, 
introduced by Deutsch, to another level where political integration is included and 
where the EU is separated from other multilateral frames of cooperation (Rieker 
&Ulriksen:2003:19).  
“Europe is developing unique forms of political organization neither by replicating the state 
form at a higher level, nor by annulling the old order, but by mixing a continuity of 
sovereignty with new forms” (Buzan & Wæver:2003:352) 
       
As to whether the EU is a great power or an important actor in the international 
system, opinions diverge. Following the arguments of Rieker & Ulriksen (2003), one 
may argue that the EU is a different superpower. The EU’s new military capabilities 
are not those of a traditional grand army used in territorial defence or the army that can 
fight wars on several continents, like the US. The purpose of the military capabilities is 
first and foremost to handle crisis management and the Petersberg tasks8. Throughout 
the civil war in Yugoslavia, and especially Bosnia, followed by the conflict in Kosovo, 
the EU had no hidden threat in forms of military forces to use as conflict prevention in 
EU’s own backyard. Using so called “soft” power tools proved insufficient in the wars 
and conflicts in the former Yugoslavia (Barth Eide:2003). Henceforth it seemed 
necessary for the EU to develop a military capability to lend credence to any foreign 
and security policy pretension. A result of this evolution can be found in the new 
security doctrine where an important part of the ESS is dedicated to the broader 
understanding of security, where “soft” power and “hard” power tools are combined. 
The EU is therefore seen as a comprehensive security actor (Rieker: 2004). Often it 
appears that the EU’s foreign and security policy can be summarised by Robert 
Coopers famous words: “Speak softly and carry a big carrot” (Cooper:2004)9.   
                                                 
8 The Petersberg tasks: humanitarian operations, rescue missions, crisis management and peacekeeping operations 
(Missiroli:2004) 
9 In 2004 Robert Cooper made a speech at the Norwegian Atlantic Committee (Cooper:2004) where he revised the former 
words of US president Franklin D Roosevelt about how one should act in foreign policy : ”Speak softly and carry a big 
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There are several examples of the EU’s emphasis in ESDP on using not only the 
military tool, but combining all instruments in the toolbox. In fact, until 200110 it was 
rather opposite. Although the ESDP is typically connected with the development of 
military capabilities, the EU has launched two international police missions as a part of 
the ESDP. In the traditional sense of security a police mission will not necessarily be 
covered by the concept, or at least it will be regarded as “low politics”. Analysing 
European security policy without using the broader concept of security does not give 
justice to the particular European approach. In this paper we will also see that the 
perception of security is one of the key differences between US and Europe. The 
further course of this thesis will be to identify what may have induced the EU to obtain 
the new military capabilities. 
 
1.4 Delimitation of the thesis 
An underlying assumption for this thesis is that there has been a dramatic change in 
the ESDP since 9/11. This argument could of course be criticised as there has been a 
continuous change within security policy since the implementation of the Maastricht 
treaty where the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was formed as the 
second pillar. When the Amsterdam treaty was implemented, it was argued that the 
introduction of a High Representative (HR) and the Petersberg tasks as formal 
elements of the EU’s foreign and security policy amounted to a revolution. 
Furthermore, some analysts would argue that the most significant change of direction 
occurred with the Franco-British summit in St. Malo in 1998, others with the EC 
meeting in Helsinki and the Headline Goals11. It is not the purpose of this paper to 
decide which decision or turning point makes the most radical change of ESDP and 
whether the trajectory after 9/11 represents a continuation rather than a break with the 
past. There are no definite answers to these questions; it all depends on how we define 
change and which kind of change one is trying to measure. There was no immediate 
change of the course of ESDP after 9/11. However, the terrorist attack emphasised that 
                                                                                                                                                        
stick”. This approach had commonly been used by traditional realists about how to act as a great power in the international 
system (Kagan:2003). See also Cooper:2003. 
10 The reason for using 2001 as the year when EU started to use their military capabilities is that the ESDP was declared 
operational during the Laeken summit in December 2001. Some use St Malo in 1998, others the Headline Goals in 1999. 
11 It was first at the Helsinki summit in December 1999 the term European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was used. 
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terrorism became a major part of the new security policy, and with its aftermath came 
a profound change in US foreign and security policy:  
“Almost any discussion of American foreign policy today must begin with the events of 
September 11th” (Hadley:2003)12.  
 
It seems useful to start analysing the effect the independent variable of changed US 
foreign policy has on the dependent variable after 9/11. To analyse the effect of path 
dependency and spill-over, the other independent variable, it is necessary to search for 
when and how decisions were made in the EU to explain the eventual path-
dependency and spill-over effect this theory predicts we will find. To find evidence of 
these effects it is necessary to analyse the integration process of security and defence 
as far behind as the Maastricht treaty. 
 
1.5 Outline 
I have so far presented the research questions and the hypotheses for the thesis. In this 
first chapter I have also presented the concept of security and how the EU can be seen 
as a security policy actor. In chapter two I will provide a presentation of the theoretical 
framework; neo-realism and institutional theory. It is natural to focus on the parts of 
the theories which will have explanatory power to my research questions. Both 
theories are to some extent controversial, and hence I will discuss my choices in the 
outcome. I will also at the end of this chapter reflect on some methodological 
challenges for this thesis. The third chapter will be used to elaborate the development 
and historical background of the ESDP. In chapter four I will try to analyse the reasons 
for change in ESDP in a neo-realistic perspective. The main focus in this chapter will 
be on the European response to the American foreign and security policy after 9/11. 
Chapter five will be analysed using institutional theory, focusing on the former 
treaties, intergovernmental conferences (IGC), European Council summits and the role 
of the institutions. Finally, I will try to summarise and give an answer to the research 
questions at large as my conclusion will end the thesis. 
 
 
                                                 
12 US Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley February 12th 2003 (Hadley:2003). 
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce two theoretical perspectives which can serve as 
analytical framework to changes in ESDP after 9/11 2001. Within studies of European 
integration, a range of theories and approaches are potentially relevant. I will however 
concentrate on two theories that I assume to be of particular pertinence to my research 
question: neo-realism and institutional theory. First in this chapter I will account for 
the choice of theories. Second, I will present the two theories and their most important 
aspects.  
The theory of neo-realism is well known within political science and was for the last 
part of the Cold War the dominant theory of international politics. Institutional theory, 
or institutionalism, however, is a common denominator for a lot of theories used more 
or less autonomously since the second part of the 1990s. European integration has 
been a key object of study, focusing on the importance of institutions in the integration 
process. In this context, the theories of neo-functionalism (NF) and historical 
institutionalism (HI) will be regarded as institutional theory13. Although there is an 
obvious difference between the two theories, Moravcsik (1998:489) indicates that the 
terms spill-over and path dependency refer more or less to the same phenomenon. The 
problems with this definition is that spill-over is often used about integration in one 
field of politics leading to similar developments in other fields, while a path- 
dependent process can occur within one specific policy area. Pierson (1998:48) points 
out that HI incorporates key aspects from NF at the same time as the theory offers a 
stronger and more analytical basis. Under the review of the theories this point will be 
elaborated further. 
 
2.1 The choice of theories 
Choosing theoretical approach is a defining task to any student of the EU. Ever since 
the first steps of European integration with the construction of the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952, different researchers have applied widely 
                                                 
13 This label is taken from Moravcsik (1998:489) where he categorizes NF and HI as the same, where he sees HI as just 
another name of NF theory. However, Moravcsik never calls these theories for “institutional theory”, he claims that NF and 
HI explain the same: ”In recent years the neo-functionalist search for a theory of integration as a self reinforcing process of 
spill-over has been revived. It is now termed ‘historical institutionalism’ (HI)”. In lack of a better term, and the fact that both 
(original) theories focus on the importance of institutions and institutionalisation of process (within EU) I have decided to use 
the term “institutional theory”. 
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contrasting theories to conceive of the development. According to Peterson (2001) 
there is a lack of truly rivalling integration theories; too often, they serve to modify or 
complement rather than compete. When focusing on ESDP, however, the particular 
problem appears that theories of European integration, general by nature, have rarely 
been aimed at the sectors of security and defence. In this sense, there is an obvious 
lack of consensus between researchers as to which theory is the best to explain the 
security policy development in the EU14. In this area of complexity I have chosen 
research questions and hypotheses that can elaborate certain aspects of the 
mechanisms behind the change of ESDP. This may be regarded as somewhat 
restrictive; constructivist theories (Katzenstein: 1996, Wendt : 1992) and rational 
theories like Neo-liberalism (Keohane & Nye: 1977, Keohane: 1984) and Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism (LI) (Moravscik:1993, 1998) are valuable contributions to the 
understanding of the development of ESDP. LI theory, however, appears more apt at 
rationalising member state strategy than the collective change of approach embodied 
in ESDP15. Another argument against using LI is that Moravcsik had little focus on 
foreign and security policy while constructing his theory (Sjursen:1999:14). Choosing 
neo-realism rather than LI stems from the logic that the former can be used to explain 
change in ESDP as a result of a structural change in the international system and at the 
same time uphold the state-centric view that LI assert. A weakness of this choice is 
that neo-realism has little place for the importance of domestic politics on foreign 
policy decision making. Nevertheless, by using HI as the complementary theoretical 
approach, this aspect should be duly covered, as HI incorporates insights from what 
Putnam (1988) introduced as the two-level game of international diplomacy. It is my 
goal to use theories that are both competing and complementary, where different levels 
work to supplement each other. Thus, the thesis will contribute to theory elaboration 
by tracing new theoretical linkages within the field of European security policy.  
During the last decade, debates within EU research have been dominated by the 
discussion between institutionalists and neo-functionalists on the one side and 
intergovernmentalists on the other (Aspinwall & Schneider:2000). Most often, the 
                                                 
14 “Like the debate over a common Community foreign policy itself, there is no agreement among academics on the most 
useful theoretical approach for comprehending this [EU foreign policy] activity” (Holland:1995:129) 
15 If my hypothesis in the introduction had been that ESDP is the product of bargains amongst EU member states that are 
driven by domestic politics (Bono:2002:9), it would have been a mistake not to use LI as a theory. 
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focus has been on internal European dynamics, with little attention on international 
structural factors. This thesis seeks to expand on this approach by perceiving the 
changes in ESDP after 9/11 as resulting from a deepening of integration as well as 
changes in the international structure. 
 
2.2 Realism and neo-realism 
Realism in political science is the description of a school of thought perceiving 
international politics as a struggle for power among autonomous states where each 
actor will seek to maximize his own interest. Although realist thoughts can be found as 
early as Thucydides16 in ancient Greece and Machiavelli (2004 - reprint) and Hobbes 
(Malnes:1993) in the Medieval, it was Hans J. Morgenthau that introduced realism as a 
theory of international relations. His “Politics among Nations” (1948) was in many 
ways based on a Hobbesian view of the human natural condition. Morgenthau 
presented the following axioms of realism: The states are the most important actors. 
The international anarchy shape state behaviour and external preferences. Power and 
security are quintessential to the states; thus they are predisposed for competition and 
conflict, and this again leads to absence of cooperation. International institutions can 
just marginally limit the effects of international anarchy on state behaviour. Realism 
emphasises the absence of superior government; there are no common norms and rules 
to predetermine state behaviour. The states are rational unitary actors driven by a 
desire to maximize interest. Conflict is unavoidable in this system as shortage of 
resources creates competition between states (Morgenthau:1948). 
 
Neo-realism is first and foremost connected with Kenneth Waltz’ “Theory of 
International Politics” (1979). In his book, Waltz argues that it is the structural 
conditions in international politics and not the characteristics of actors in the system 
that best explain the behaviour of states17. Waltz updates realist analysis by paying 
attention to the systemic level. Because the structure is stable it is possible to rationally 
explain the behaviour of states, for example the forging of alliances and the waging of 
                                                 
16 The Greek historian Thucydides tried around 400 BC to explain the war between Sparta and Athens where he so famously 
said: “the strong do what they will, and the weak do what they must” (Cited from Knutsen:1999:354). 
17 According to Knutsen (1999:353) Waltz concept of structure has other roots than social science. It emerges from micro 
economy, and especially American theories of welfare economy. 
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war. Such choices are conditioned by the structure and will repeat themselves18 
(Ulriksen: 1997:1). Furthermore, in the study of international relations one cannot 
analyse the constituents of the system (the states) and draw conclusions on the whole 
(the system of states) - therefore system-level analysis is something more than 
interaction between states (Knutsen:1999: 339/340). According to Waltz, there are 
three factors that determine the character of a political structure; (i) an ordering 
principle, (ii) differentiation in function among the units, and (iii) the distribution of 
capabilities among the units (Waltz:1979:88). The ordering principle in the 
international system is anarchy, and anarchy fosters self-help behaviour among 
states19. Furthermore, neo-realism emphasizes that states are “like units”, and there are 
no formal functional differentiation among these units. All states fulfil, or try to fulfil, 
similar tasks according to their capabilities and systemic constraints. The distribution 
of capabilities in the system is decided by the number of poles or great powers in the 
system, and this affects state behaviour20. The structure of the system only varies 
around one dimension; the distribution of power.  
“A national system is not one of self-help. The international system is” (Waltz:1979:104) 
 
 2.2.1 Balance of power and balance of threat 
Waltzian neo-realism appears insufficient to explain the reasons for change in ESDP21. 
Nevertheless, a refined neo-realist theory where balance of power is combined with 
balance of threat may have a broader explanatory reach. According to Waltz (1979) 
the theory of power balance is of general applicability, international systems differing 
mainly along the number of poles that constitute their structures. Power balance theory 
can be used on all anarchic situations (Waltz:1979:118). The utilization of this model 
hinges on the assumption that states strive, if not to maximize power, then at least to 
maintain their position in the system and the observation that states behave differently 
                                                 
18 The conduct of international relations cannot simply be explained with reference to human nature or the inherent properties 
of states. It must also take structure into account. Neo-realism is thus a theory of how structural properties of anarchy provide 
particular sets of limitations upon possibilities for actions in international politics (Rosamond:2000:132). 
19 Waltz prefer the term “self help” rather than anarchic, which he thinks is too ambiguous. See also Knutsen:1999:344 
20 According to Waltz (1979) this functional differentiation has been formalized since 1815. Changes in this system occur 
when the number of poles changes from many to three, two or one, or the other way around. A system change has only 
occurred once the 400-500 years before 1979, this happened after the Second World War (Ulriksen:1997:3). 
21 A major weakness with the neo-realistic approach is that it ignores the impact of historical, political and societal change. 
Furthermore, the pessimistic assumptions of cooperation do not fit the EU evolution (Hyde Price:2004:101). 
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in different systems. In every system states will seek to balance power, and the number 
of poles in the system will decide the different strategies for doing so. This leads to the 
assumption that alliances are more important in multipolar systems than in bipolar 
ones (Ulriksen:1997:3), while the system is more stable when it is bipolar22 . In a 
multipolar system states use alliances as a means to balance power. In bipolar systems 
states tend to rely on the mobilization of their own resources for the same purpose. It is 
a general principle that international stability (defined as the absence of a grand war) 
increases when the number of great powers is reduced. The fewer great powers, the 
bigger interest each great power will have in maintaining status quo; furthermore, each 
of these powers will have greater control over the systemic factors in play 
(Knutsen:1999:346/347). Great powers act to regulate the system because it is their 
natural role in the system:  
“The balance of power is the result of realpolitik, which is the rationale for foreign policy, 
not the end or aim” (Waltz:1979:117) 
 
Certain aspects of state behaviour will always continue. Power of balance politics can 
be found in all inter-state relationships at all times, in all places irrespective of which 
fraction, dynasty or person is governing the states (Knutsen:1999:341). Balance 
suggests that there are similar values in both weight pans, and the result is equilibrium. 
Put in the balance of power context, Waltz suggests that there is always some kind of 
disequilibrium that has to be restored by either side in the struggle for security 
(Sheehan:1996). The states in the system are forced to play the balancing game, even 
if they would rather spend their limited resources on other programs as welfare for the 
state’s citizens23. 
In debates on balance of power the contribution from Stephen Walt (1987) is 
recognised as particularly important. In his study on the origins of alliances he argues 
that states balances threat, not power. He defines threat as a function of distribution of 
power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities and the perceived intention of 
                                                 
22 It is important to emphasise that “Theory of International Politics” was written when the Cold War was at its coldest. The 
1970s was a period where US and USSR leadership developed a stable understanding for the game between the superpowers. 
At the same time it was easy to use contemporary examples to reject the theory of complex interdependence by referring to 
the two superpowers (Knutsen:1999:346/347).  
23 ”Obviously the system won’t work if all states loose interest in preserving themselves. It will however continue to work if 
some states do, while others do not, chose to lose their political identities, say through amalgamation” (Waltz:1979:118) 
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states. Walt argues that threats stem from the perception of “aggressive intentions” 
rather than from any objective assessment. He exemplifies this claim with how Japan 
and Europe balanced the US economically and not militarily during the Cold War 
because the threat from the US was economic, not a military threat. At the same time, 
the US was the security guarantee in their security community, which made 
specialisation in the field of economy possible for Germany and Japan24. In the 
balance of threat perspective, whether or not (and in what domain) states want to 
balance a dominant state will depend on the foreign policy behaviour of that state 
(Mastanduno:1997:60). Thus, unipolarity may be preserved for a longer period than 
what the theory of balance of power anticipates. However, unipolarity will not be 
perennial, but could be sustained for a longer period depending on how other states in 
the system react to the foreign policy of the hegemon (Ibid:1997:60). Following the 
concepts of Morgenthau (1948), other states in the system are either “status quo states” 
or “antagonists” (“revisionists”)25. The status quo states do not want to challenge the 
existing structure of the system while the antagonist states would want the power 
redistributed and hence a structural change may occur.  Dealing with the status quo 
states the hegemon would want to please and accommodate their conviction that they 
are secure in the structure so that they would not want to enhance their military 
capabilities. In dealings with antagonists, however, the dominant hegemon would use 
policies of confrontation and containment. The third category of states in the system 
comprises states that are “on the fence”. Waltz’ theory predicts that the hegemon will 
approach these with accommodations in hope that they will not turn into antagonists 
(Mastanduno:1997:61-62). 
 
2.2.2 Neo-realism, subsystems and the EU 
In order to use neo-realism about the contemporary situation and the EU’s 
development since the Cold War, Ulriksen (1997) introduces a new concept to explain 
                                                 
24 According to Hyde Price (2004:112) the problem with Walt’s theory is that the concept of “intentions” is under-specified 
and under-theorised. The main flaw is exemplified by the lack of explaining France and Britain’s behaviour towards NATO 
in the 1960s where both countries perceived the same threat (from USSR) and both countries disposed roughly the same 
capabilities. Nevertheless, their policies towards NATO were totally different.   
25 In this thesis I will use the concept ”antagonist” instead of “revisionist” because the historical interpretation of the 
“revisionist” concept might indicate a connection of the foreign policy of Japan, Germany and Italy during the inter war years 
and later it was linked to the polices of Hitler and Stalin (Evans:1998). 
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the phenomenon within the neo-realist school of thoughts. In many terms it is possible 
to define EU-Europe as a subsystem26 in international politics. The difference between 
a subsystem and the international system can be explained with the possibility of what 
is called institutionalisation of “process” 27 (Keohane:1989), which refers to state 
interaction. A high level of institutionalisation will lead to structural changes in the 
subsystem, and contradictory to the international system, the structure in the 
subsystem may become hierarchical. Still, the balance of power logic will be 
sustained. If a regional power dominates their subsystem, the other global power(s) 
will try to prevent this state from entering the global stage as rivals to themselves28. 
However, the EU is not a state, and as a non-state actor it does not fit into structural 
analysis based on the interaction between states (Ulriksen:1997:11). The EU as a 
subsystem differs therefore from the international system on the deeper levels of 
structure and on the density of and the level of institutionalisation of process. The 
Union becomes the sum of all member state preferences and especially the preferences 
of the great powers in Europe29. In this sense the EU is not only a subsystem but also 
an independent actor where it becomes an agent for the principal member states. 
Previously, the EU did not have this role within security and defence policy. The 
question of balance of power/balance of threat regarding the EU becomes a question of 
whether or not the great powers of Europe would want or allow the EU to have this 
role. Following neo-realist assumptions, balancing efforts towards a dominating state 
might occur in the EU if this is the sum of the preferences of the great powers of 
Europe30. 
A subsystem might be a security complex and the other way around, but the European 
subsystem described here is not a security complex. The European subsystem does not 
include for instance Russia or Turkey for that matter, while the European security 
complex obviously does (Ulriksen:1997). In this analysis the EU as a subsystem will 
eradicate the problems of using neo-realism as an analytical tool because the states in 
                                                 
26.The idea of Europe as a subsystem in a realist context can also be found in Hill (1994). 
27 “EU-Europe is the most institutionalized part of the world” (Buzan & Wæver:2003:352). 
28 The problem using this theoretical explanation is that it fits perfectly where the states are the primary actors in the game. 
29 The EU is viewed as a mechanism for interstate cooperation in Europe driven by the preferences of the most powerful 
states in the game (Rosamond:2000:133) 
30 “The ordering principle in the EU is not anarchy, but rather a coordinated system of rule based upon the separating 
principle of pooled sovereignty, varying in strength and intensity over issue areas, and reinforced by the transfer of power to 
certain institutional non-state actors” (Ulriksen:1997:13). 
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the European subsystem are not seen as Hobbesian rivals in an anarchic Europe as 
neo-realism predicts. Thus, introducing the European subsystem as a concept, the 
revision of the theory will avoid making flawed predictions about state interactions in 
Europe; however, the theory will still be valid in the international structure as a whole. 
 
2.3 Institutional theory 
Most commonly, institutional theory, or institutionalism, is a denominator for three 
different theories, historical institutionalism (HI), sociological institutionalism and 
rational choice (Aspinwall & Schneider:2000). Sociological institutionalism 
emphasises the independent role of institutions in shaping identities and preferences; 
rational choice theory adds the assumption that outcomes follow from political choice. 
As indicated in the introduction of this chapter, in this thesis the label institutional 
theory will be used about NF and HI, more specifically about the terms spill-over and 
path-dependency, which are core concepts of the two theories31. 
 
2.3.1 Neo-functionalism (NF) 
The theory of NF is by many regarded as synonymous to integration theory. Following 
the thoughts of David Mitrany (1943) and other functionalists, NF became a new 
social mindset that emerged after the Second World War and matured in the 1950s. 
The desire of NF theory was in particular to establish a framework for further research; 
secondly, neo-functionalism was evidently bound up with the strategies of the 
founding architects of the European Community (Rosamond:2000:50). A normative 
penchant was apparent in the support for ever closer union as the target of European 
integration, the main concern of which was to substitute political unity for tragic 
rivalry on the continent. For this purpose purposeful institutions were quintessential 
conduits of integration (Dedman:1996). In his book “The Uniting of Europe” (1958), 
Ernst Haas tried to theorize the strategies of Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, among 
others, the founding elite of post war unity. Haas described their technocratic and 
functionalist approach as a direct rejection of the idealism of the federalist 
                                                 
31 “[…] the development of institutional complexity of the second pillar underlines the necessity for detailed institutional 
analysis in order to understand the behaviour of the EU as a foreign and security policy actor” (Hyde Price:2004:106). 
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movement32. By many, Haas was seen as the first and most important neo-functionalist 
scholar (Rosamond:2000:51) and later he contributed with “Beyond the Nation State” 
(1964) and a second edition of “The Uniting of Europe” 33. The core of NF theory 
turned towards process rather than outcome, interaction perceived as a complex web 
of actors pursuing their own interests within a pluralist political environment. One of 
the most important and, indeed, controversial concepts within NF, was the idea of 
spill-over34. The concept was used to depict the mechanisms supposedly driving 
processes of regional integration (Rosamond:2000:55-59). 
According to Haas (1958) spill-over can be explained as progressive integration in one 
economic sector creating pressures for further economic integration within and beyond 
that sector, creating as side-effect a greater authoritative capacity at the European 
level. The creation of ECSC and the integration of coal and steel sectors would yield 
substantial benefits for key economic actors, but the full integration of the coal and 
steel sectors would not be accomplished without the integration in cognate sectors of 
economy, i.e.  transport etc. ( Rosamond:2000:59-65). 
 
Steps toward integration at any given time tend to generate unexpected pressures for 
further integration (spill-over). Once initial decisions are taken, unintended feedback 
from those decisions becomes the primary force underlying integration (Haas:1958 
xxi). Haas separates between functional and political spill-over. Functional spill-over 
occurs when cooperation in certain sectors of the economy (or society) creates 
technocratic pressure for cooperation in adjoining sectors, thereby propelling 
integration forward (Ibid:xxxiii). Political spill-over occurs when ongoing cooperation 
in certain areas empowers supranational officials to act as informal political 
entrepreneurs in other areas. In order to manage complex technical issues more 
effectively, rational governments must delegate discretion to experts, judges, and 
bureaucrats, thereby creating powerful new supranational actors with a vested interest 
                                                 
32 A federal outcome might be the ultimate goal for NF, but this would not be achieved through the pursuit of rational 
argument and forward-thinking constitutional design, but through incremental and strategic means (Rosamond:2000). 
33 “As a theoretical prospectus, it [NF] contemplated the replacement of power politics with a new supranational style, built 
around a core procedural consensus which resembled that of most domestic political systems” (Rosamond:2000:73) 
34 Leon Lindberg uses this definition of spill-over (1963:10) : “a situation in which a given action, related to a specific goal, 
creates a situation  in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn create further 
condition and a need for more action and so forth”. 
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in cooperation (Ibid:xii-lvi). In other words, the success of integration initiatives draws 
self-interested groups of actors into the game and both forms of spill-over are 
promoted by purposeful supranational institutions. The automaticity of spill-over in 
economics required a measure of political activism and some sectors contained more 
spill-over potential than others. According to Rosamond (2000:62) Haas argued that 
spill-over and integration were more likely to occur within sectors of economic 
significance than on issues linked to culture, foreign policy and defence. The spill-over 
hypothesis seemed to suggest that integration was a linear, progressive phenomenon; 
that once started; dynamics would be installed to continue the momentum. 
 
2.3.2 Historical institutionalism (HI) 
According to Paul Pierson (1998), institutions have both their own value and their own 
interests, and can act as independent actors in the decision making process. The term 
“historical” refers to the belief that political development must be understood as a 
process that evolves over time; “institutional” points to the belief that the implications 
of these historical processes are constructed and maintained in institutions 
(Pierson:1998:30). Furthermore, the historical dimension implies that limited 
information and knowledge about future consequences leads to non-intended effects 
and spill-over. This dynamic will again be the basis for future treaty revisions. Such a 
focus on general mechanisms is an alternative conceptualisation of the spill-over 
effects we know especially from NF integration theory. HI is covering a range of 
theoretical schools that have tried to combine social science concerns and methods 
with a recognition that social processes must be understood as a historical 
phenomenon (Ibid:1998:35). 
As with NF, HI is not directly opposed towards LI, but in many terms the theory was 
developed as an alternative view to the state-centric LI approach. With the argument 
that European scholars have generally depicted the European community as a more 
complex and pluralistic political structure, less firmly under the control of member 
state governments,  Pierson argues that member states are still the most important 
actors and decision makers, which is in accordance with LI main assumptions. 
Nevertheless, the most important distinction is that HI modifies a rational actor model 
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through emphasising the lack of information, overview and insight a decision maker 
has on the results of the policy they decide hereby rejecting the idea that European 
integration is a controlled only by, and a product of, intergovernmental conferences 
(IGC) (Moravcsik:1993). HI tries to explain that the need to analyse the consequences 
of negotiations over time is of outmost importance. The member states of the EU will 
not be in full control over the negotiation situation, but have to take in account former 
political decisions and experience, thus creating limitations for the member states. 
When the next round of negotiation is started, the member states are still the main 
actors, but often in a different context – one operates within the limitations made by 
one’s predecessors (Pierson:1998:50)35. 
The institutional approach reveals important aspects of decision making which have all 
too often been ignored in the past. Political institutions like the EU are not static; they 
are continually changing and adapting. Decisions are taken on basis of norms and rules 
that are deduced from experience and learning, rather than on the calculations of 
preferences and the anticipation of future events. The rules and procedures within an 
organisation are institutionalised. They are taken for granted, guiding decision makers 
in their efforts to interpret and create meaning out of the situation. Institutions evolve 
in a path dependent way. This means that a decision made at one stage create 
opportunities and constraints for decision making at a later stage. In most cases 
institutions change slowly and incrementally within the existing procedures and norms 
(Sverdrup:1998:4-6). Another implication is where one has national adjustments to 
previous agreements, which again effects and structures future decisions at the next 
cross-roads (Ibid:1998:8)36. The question is not, accordingly, whether institutions 
matter, but where, to what extent and why (Andersen:2003:17). Institutions provide an 
environment in which political struggles are played out and which structure the game 
by a set of rules. The actors are therefore conditioned by the accumulation of 
procedures, rules and norms over time. Identities, priorities, interpretations of reality  
                                                 
35 “Studying processes of policy and institutional change over time reveals that gaps may well be extensive, and the prospects 
for recapturing lost control are often quite limited” (Pierson:1998:50)  
36 The enlargement to the East seems to be an irreversible process, mainly due to path dependency. The sceptics found it 
difficult to argue against an enlargement on the base of legitimacy as the opposition of this process was seen as illegitimate 
and contradictory to the value and norm foundation of the EU as an organisation (Schimmelfennig:2001).  
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are all created by this path dependent37 context (Aspinwall & Schneider:2000:6-7). 
When European integration is examined over time, the gaps in member state 
government control appear far more prominent than they do in intergovernmentalist 
accounts (Pierson:1998:30). HI cuts across the usual sharp dichotomy between rational 
choice and non-rational choice work, drawing instead on research within both 
traditions that emphasises the significance of temporal processes. Thus it includes 
rational choice analyses that consider issues of institutional evolution and path 
dependence crucial (Pierson1998:34). This institutional evolution can be exemplified 
on how existing internal dynamics inevitable leads to a closer union, even without 
deliberate political actions (Olsen:2000). 
HI emphasises, among others, four factors that weakens member states control over 
the integration process (Pierson:1998:35-50). In this sense, that is deviation between 
their planned and their actual control over the integration process. 
The first factor is the so-called partial autonomy of European Community 
organisations38.The second factor is the restricted time-horizons of political decision 
makers. Political decision makers are frequently more interested in the short-term 
consequences of their actions; long term effects are often bi-products of actions taken 
under political pressure: “The principal reason is the logic of electoral politics” 
(Pierson: 1998:30). The third factor is unanticipated consequences39. In his article, 
Pierson calls this process a “spill-over” effect, using Haas’ concept as a partly 
explanation on the lack of member state control over the integration process. The spill-
over effect becomes a result of time limitations, little information, the need to delegate 
decision making to experts, and of course asymmetric access to information. The 
fourth factor is the Shift in Chiefs of Government policy preferences. The four factors 
are not a part of the theoretical assumptions of path dependency itself, merely; they 
provide arguments against nation state control over the integration process.  
 
 
                                                 
37 Path dependency is defined as :“[…] what happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a 
sequence of events occurring in a later point in time” (Sewell:1996:262/63) 
38 Pierson (1998:35) mentions the European Parliament (EP) and the Commission as examples. 
39 “Efforts to integrate some aspects of complex modern societies without the changing other components may prove 
problematic because the sectors to be integrated cannot be effectively isolated. The more “tightly coupled” government 
policies are, the more likely it is that actions in one realm will have unanticipated effects in others”. (Pierson:1998:40/41). 
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2.4 Methodological reflections 
Following the grain of studies on security and European integration, it appears most 
pertinent to make use of case study as research design. Among the virtues of case 
study is, quite decisively, the proximity to out object of study:  
“By concentrating on a single phenomenon or entity, [one may] uncover the interaction of 
significant factors or characteristics of the phenomenon” (Rieker:2004:29) 
 
Case studies have dominated EU research since the first attempts to grasp European 
integration, but they represent vastly different theoretical ambitions and sophistication.  
The case study is but one of several ways of doing social science research. In general, 
case studies are the preferred strategy when “why” or “how” questions are being 
posed, when the investigator has little control over the events, and when the focus is 
on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context (Yin:1989:1)40. Implicit 
in most social scientific notions of case analysis is the idea that the objects of 
investigation are similar enough and separate enough to permit treating them as 
comparable instances of the same general phenomenon (Ragin:1992:1). Case studies 
are used to develop and test empirical implications on theoretical formulations. A case 
study is an empirical inquiry that:  
“investigates a contemporary phenomenon within real life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin:1989:1). 
 
There are clearly divergent positions over the extent to which case studies may be used 
scientifically. One of the main views underlines the insufficiency of case studies as 
scientific method. At the opposite side one finds the argument that case studies 
represent the real scientific method. The basis for this claim is that the ambition to 
generalise and test hypotheses is restrained. A third view emphasises the 
complementarities of case studies, or qualitative studies on one hand, and quantitative 
studies on the other. Case studies are seen as a main supplier of hypotheses and ideas 
which may act as the basis for quantitative research and studies (Andersen:1997:13-
14). The tradition of conventional case studies represents countless variables but only 
one case, and quantitative research on the other hand has been few variables and many 
                                                 
40 The research question for this thesis could easily have been changed to: “Why is there a change in ESDP”, thereby 
confronting and meeting these standards. 
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cases (Ragin et al 1996:750). One of the major challenges within case study research is 
exactly the problem of countless variables and only one case. Trying to analyse a 
development in the EU focusing on both internal and external factors provides a range 
of potential variables, which necessitates the use of hypotheses to guide the process. 
One problem, however, is that case studies often are so complex that the hypothesis 
cannot be verified or falsified. In this thesis the use of hypotheses is cursory, as 
guidelines of investigation; ideally, hypotheses are best suited when performing 
quantitative and delimited research. 
An early definition of case study has been:  
“The essence of a case study, the central tendency among all types of case study is that it tries 
to illuminate a decision or a set of decision: why they are taken, how they were implemented 
and with what result” (Schramm 1971 cited in Yin:1989:12). 
 
The essence of this study is exactly to analyse a set of decisions, and especially, why 
they are taken. The study of European integration has most often used case studies to 
contribute to theory (i) construction and (ii) elaboration, thus seeking to generalise 
where other categories apply cases to interpret and explain existing theory 
(Andersen:1997:127). This thesis does not aim for conclusions beyond the research 
questions (generalisation); I will nevertheless attempt to contribute towards theory 
elaboration. 
 
2.4.1 Expected empirical findings 
In order to pinpoint empirical evidence, we need an operational definition of what 
findings may strengthen or reject the two theories’ different assumptions. The 
operational definition is necessary both for the validity and the reliability of the thesis 
because it indicates which operations that has to be done in order to determine whether 
or not the empirical phenomenon is a part of the concept we want to measure or not 
(Hellevik:1999:51). If balance of power/balance of threat theory is correct in its 
assumptions, which evidence will we find? What are the findings that can prove path 




Evidence of balance of power/balance of threat: 
a) There is a marked change in US foreign and security policy after 9/11.  
b) European countries have the perception that the changed US policy is a threat to their 
ability to maximize their own interests 
c) European reactions will lead to a marked enhancement of the ESDP on the expense of 
NATO and the nation states 
d) European reactions will contribute to the making of an independent security strategy 
for the EU which will emphasise the effort to power balance the US 
e) European reactions will contribute to the execution of EU lead military operations  
 
Evidence of path dependency and spill-over: 
a) Any change of US foreign and security policy will have no direct influence on the 
security and defence integration within ESDP 
b) Changes in nation state preferences will have little effect on the change in ESDP and it 
is the Commission and the ESDP institutions that are the main suppliers of proposals 
for change 
c) A marked enhancement of the ESDP is a result of the integration process where 
previous decisions give unanticipated consequences and make constraints for the 
decision makers’ possibilities for action.  
d) The spill-over effect from the economic integration and the enlargement process and 
the autonomous role of institutions will lead to a deepening of ESDP integration which 
in turn will make it necessary to produce a security strategy for the EU  
e) The execution of military operations is a result of a functional spill-over effect 
initiated originally from the St Malo process together with the preparations and 
influence of the ESDP institutions operating in a path dependent context 
 
One of the major challenges in this thesis is to find evidence that any particular action 
or event is the result of path dependence or spill-over. The main methodological issue 
is to prove that some specific details in the development of ESDP would have been 
different if the contextual and institutional setting had been otherwise. In other words; 
some of the assumptions of path dependency and spill-over might be impossible to 
confirm or reject because there is no empirical evidence of the opposite. 
Despite the obvious challenges of finding evidence of institutional theory assumptions, 
there are still some indicators that can be used. The surest sign of path dependency can 
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be found in analysing the text of the treaties and if there is evidence of the treaties 
making restrictions to any future decision making and if the adopted text do not 
change its original character and thus become more or less an irreversible process. 
Furthermore, the evidence of a political spill-over effect and the agenda setting role of 
institutions would be found in official documents of the EU, the different treaties and 
statements. It is more difficult to find evidence of a functional spill-over effect. 
However, if one finds evidence of a deeper integration (which can be exemplified with 
the construction of an institution) within the security and defence sector which was not 
part of the original intent of a decision, it will be an indication of a functional spill-
over effect.  
 
Some of the same challenges can be found using balance of power/balance of threat 
theory. Do we know that it is the effort of trying to balance the US which makes the 
EU member states reach consensus and decide to make changes in the ESDP? One 
way to find evidence of a European reaction is if there is close correlation in time 
between what we can assume to be “aggressive intentions” from the US and a shift in 
ESDP policy or any political actions within ESDP which can be regarded not to be in 
US interests. Another way to see evidence of the ESDP as the tool or the forum where 
balancing efforts are taking place can be found in official European Council statements 
and documents and speeches made by CFSP/ESDP spokesmen. The evidence of 
balance of threat could be found in the EU making an opposite official approach than 
the US, focusing on a broader understanding of security, multilateralism and the UN 
and legitimacy of military interventions. As indicated above, a final evidence of 
balance of power/balance of threat can be found if the EU executes military operations 
on its own. 
 
2.4.2 Sources 
The sources of the analysis in this thesis can mainly be divided in primary and 
secondary sources. The primary sources include official EU documents as the treaties, 
white papers, official reports, and other original and official documents as strategy 
papers from European Council meetings and press releases. Pointing out the unilateral 
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change in US foreign policy, I will also use official US documents and speeches by 
key government spokesmen. At the same time, speeches from European leaders will be 
applied. The secondary sources in this thesis include books, articles and newsletters by 
other scholars and researchers. Magazines, newspapers and periodical journals will 
also be used. All sources have their advantages and disadvantages. Official documents 
are characterised by their diplomatic and formal language, and they are sometimes 
made by a purpose, often not being objective, and sometimes they will try to cover the 
lack of result and progress, thus focusing on what has been accomplished and not what 
went wrong. Therefore, the obvious choice would be to use several different sources 
so that they can confirm, reject or complement each other.  
 
It is important both for the sake of validity and reliability to use source criticism and 
be mindful that the choice of documents have importance for the outcome of the 
analysis. Therefore it could have been wise to use “triangulation” to confirm the 
findings from the documents with interviews of key personnel. But in this thesis I have 
reached a conclusion not to use interviews. The reason for this is that the interview 
objects that could have illuminated my research questions are primarily politicians 
such as chiefs of governments, foreign ministers or the other ambassadors to the EU or 
their closest counsellors. The main problem with these individuals is their availability 
and the fact that the interviews would have to be abroad. After many attempts through 
both official and unofficial channels to reach interview objects, and the lack of 
resources to perform these interviews abroad, I decided not to have interviews in this 
thesis. This decision is an obvious weakness because the advantage of such interviews 
could have been a confirmation or rejection of the different findings from the 
documents, speeches and articles analysed. However, perfect validity is almost 
impossible to reach in the world of science, and sometimes the resources and 







The end of the Cold War created an international structure where the possibilities of 
global war more or less disappeared (Cooper:2003). This new situation affected 
especially the transatlantic relationship, but also the relationship between the European 
states. As an indirect result of the fall of the Soviet empire, the EU now consists of 25 
member states. This political and international revolution has changed the dominant 
perceptions of security and defence in Europe. Essentially, the end of the Cold War 
created a scenario where Europe did not need to import American security; conversely, 
Europe was no longer America’s first line of defence. Initiating a strengthened EU 
security identity may thus be seen as a product of the end of bipolarity. 
 
3.1 European security identity and Common Foreign and Security Policy  
Nation-state security identities are shaped over time, and in response to changes in the 
environment. The various national security identities in Western Europe towards the 
late 1980s were largely coloured by the Cold War period with their emphasis on 
military territorial defence against a potential attack from the East (Rieker:2004:21). 
Although the Western European Union (WEU) had existed since 1948, the European 
security identity in the western part of Europe was connected to the transatlantic 
relationship and NATO. During the 1980s there was a small revival of European 
security cooperation with the Rome declaration in 1984 and the Hague platform in 
1987 which created a platform on European security interests. However, it was only 
after the end of the Cold War that the western European countries started to develop 
their own security identity. The term “European Security and Defence Identity” was 
first used about the CFSP which became a part of the Maastricht treaty41. The term 
was also employed in NATO statements and appeared in 1994 following the three 
years of heated debate on the new role of NATO and identity in European security 
architecture after the demise of the Cold War bipolarity (NATO:2002). The wish for a 
European Pillar within NATO had been replaced with the construction of the CFSP in 
the EU.  
The “Europeanisation” of security identity among the member states of the EU was 
                                                 
41 The Final Act of the Maastricht treaty declared that: “the Member States of WEU welcome the development of the 
European security and defence identity” (Article J.4.4, TEU) 
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not the only part which seemed to lead to the CFSP in Maastricht in 1991. In 1970 the 
European Political Cooperation (EPC) was launched, however, it was only with the 
Single European Act in 1987 that it was formally enshrined42. The main feature of the 
EPC was the consultation process between member states within foreign policy. In 
many ways, the EPC became the predecessor of the CFSP, which made a qualitative 
leap in integrating the foreign and security policy of the Union under Maastricht: 
 “The common foreign and security policy (CFSP) shall include all questions related to the 
security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which 
might in time lead to a common defence” (Art J.4.1, TEU)43
 
The Maastricht treaty in 1991 (implemented in 1993) made it possible for the EU in 
certain issues to perform as a unitary actor in foreign policy. The EU could now, at 
least intentionally, speak with one voice on the international stage, hereby expressing 
its position on armed conflicts, human rights and any other subject linked to foreign 
and security policy. The CFSP was developed as the second pillar of the EU with an 
intergovernmental decision making structure (Haine:2004). 
 
3.2 From Amsterdam to the Headline Goals and Nice 
The Amsterdam treaty of 1997 went beyond Maastricht and continued the process of a 
deeper and more integrated CFSP with a possibility for an integration of the WEU in 
the EU. At the same time the second pillar was strengthened with establishing a High 
Representative (HR) for the CFSP and adding the Petersberg tasks which was decided 
upon by WEU in 1992, to the functions of the EU. 
A main turning point in the evolution of security policy in the EU was the St Malo 
summit between France and Britain. The meeting took place in December 1998, at a 
time when the Kosovo conflict seemed destined to repeat the bloody warfare in 
Bosnia. For the first time the ability to develop military capabilities was mentioned: 
 
“[…] the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military 
forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to 
international crisis” (St Malo Declaration 1998) 
                                                 
42 The EPC was a part of the Hague platform which was initialised with the Single European Act in 1986. 
43 After the Amsterdam treaty this article was referred to as article 17. 
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One of the most noticeable differences on display at St Malo was the end of Britain’s 
opposition to militarization of the EU; it also formalised the process of integrating 
WEU functions into the EU. This evolution continued in the EC meeting in Cologne in 
July 1999 where the Petersberg tasks were placed at the core of CFSP and the summit 
also agreed to give the EU a capacity to implement them, hereby following the process 
which started in St Malo. The statement in St Malo was amended with :   
“[in order to respond to] international crisis without prejudice to actions by NATO. The EU 
will thereby increase its ability to contribute to international peace and security in 
accordance with the principles of the UN charter” (European Council: 1999a). 
 
In addition to these changes it was also decided to establish new institutions in the near 
future including an EU military committee (EUMC), an EU military staff (EUMS) and 
a permanent Political and Security Committee (PSC) consisting of political and 
military experts. During the Helsinki EC summit in December 1999 the heads of state 
agreed on further development of the now established ESDP. The summit established 
so-called Headline Goals (HG) for ESDP which was to construct a military force of up 
to 60.000 troops (equivalent with 15 brigades) on a 60 days readiness which could be 
sustainable in a mission for at least 1 year. The European Rapid Reaction Force 
(ERRF) was to be operational by 2003 and was meant to be used for the Petersberg 
tasks44. Secondly, the Helsinki summit decided to establish new political and military 
bodies and structures within the Council for the political guidance and strategic 
directions of such operations. Further, to develop structures for consultation, co-
operation and transparency between the EU and NATO, to allow non-EU European 
NATO members and other interested states to contribute to EU military crisis 
management, and finally to establish a non-military crisis management mechanism to 
coordinate the civilian and military resources at the disposal of the Union45. 
Following the Cologne declarations and the Helsinki HG, the treaty of Nice was 
signed by the heads of state in December 2000 (implemented in March 2003). 
Accordingly, the Nice Treaty also amended previous treaties in certain matters. The 
                                                 
44 “These forces should be military self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, 
logistics or other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements” (Umbach:2002:5). 
45 “The European Council underlines its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where 
NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU led military operations in response to international crises. This 
process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army” (European Council: 1999b)  
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Political and Security Committee (PSC) was amended in article 25. At the same time 
the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and the European Union Military 
staff (EUMS) was formally established (Umbach:2002:5). The European Council also 
adopted a declaration on the ESDP46 and the concept of ESDP (or CESDP at first) was 
now a well integrated part of the CFSP in the EU. 
 
3.3 The ESDP development after 9/11  
The next step of the development of ESDP was the EC summit in Laeken in December 
2001. The summit adopted a declaration on the operational capability of the ESDP. 
Following this development, the EU and NATO made a common declaration on ESDP 
which became known as the Berlin plus agreement, formalised in March 200347: 
In 2003 the first operation for the ESDP was the take over of the International Police 
Task Force (IPTF) in Bosnia Herzegovina (BiH). From the 1st of January 2003 the EU 
was responsible for 500 police officers monitoring and assisting local police in BiH. In 
March 2003 the EU lead its first military operation in the former Yugoslavian republic 
of Macedonia. The EU mission was called operation “Concordia” and it was the first 
to rely on NATO assets and capabilities under the Berlin plus arrangements. 
Approximately 350 soldiers and officers from 27 (13 EU and 14 non-EU) countries 
were deployed to replace the NATO operation “Allied harmony”. The mission ended 
in December 2003 and was followed by another EU police mission in Macedonia, 
operation “Proxima” with some 200 police officers deployed (Quille:2003). 
In June 2003 the EU conducted its second military operation in DR Congo with a 
mandate from the United Nations (UN). The name of the operation was “Artemis” and 
it was the first EU military operation outside Europe. The mission was lead by French 
forces and was conducted without recourse to NATO assets. The EUMC monitored the 
                                                 
46 “In accordance with the texts approved by the European Council in Nice concerning the European security and defence 
policy (Presidency report and Annexes), the objective for the European Union is for that policy to become operational 
quickly. A decision to that end will be taken by the European Council as soon as possible in 2001 and no later than its 
meeting in Laeken/Brussels, on the basis of the existing provisions of the Treaty on European Union. Consequently, the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Nice does not constitute a precondition”. (Declaration on the European security and defence 
policy. Annex to the Treaty of Nice:2001) 
47 Berlin plus: 1) Assured access to NATO planning capabilities for EU led Crisis Management operations (CMO), 2) 
Availability of NATO assets and capabilities for EU led CMO, 3) Procedures for Release, Monitoring, Return and Recall of 
NATO Assets and Capabilities, 4) EU-NATO consultations arrangements in the context of an EU led CMO making use of 
NATO assets and capabilities, 5) Terms of Reference for DSACEUR and European Command Options for NATO, and 6) 
Arrangements for coherent and mutually reinforcing Capability requirements (NATO: 2003) 
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proper execution of the mission, whilst the PSC exercised political control and 
strategic direction under the direct supervision of the Council. Aside from France, the 
force of approximately 1.400 troops consisted of soldiers and officers from Sweden, 
United Kingdom, Germany and Belgium (and also 4 non-EU contributors). The 
mission ended in September 2003 (Mace:2003). In December that year the ESS was 
signed, becoming the first security policy evaluation which was made on the EU level. 
In February 2004 Germany endorsed a Franco-British proposal to create so called 
battle groups so as to strengthen the EU rapid reaction capability to support UN 
operations. The experience from Operation Artemis in DR Congo was a typical 
scenario in which the battle groups may be deployed. The trilateral proposal for EU 
battle groups consists of 1500 troops in battalion size formations. These should be 
available within 15 days notice and sustainable for at least 30 days (extendable to 120 
days with rotation). The forces should be flexible enough to undertake operations in 
distant crisis areas (as failed states) under, but not exclusively, a UN mandate. The 
forces should also be able to conduct combat missions in extremely hostile 
environment. The expected operational date was set to 2007, but the EU could have 
two or three of the battle groups available much sooner based on existing capabilities 
and voluntary contributions under the Headline Goal Force Catalogue. Within 2007 it 
is expected that the EU will be able to make use of 6-10 battle groups dependant on 
the member states’ ability to  contribute with forces (Quille:2004).  
In June 2004 the EC summit passed a new Headline Goal for 2010. At the same time 
the creation of the European Defence Agency (EDA) became a fact48.  
 
December 2nd 2004 the EU took over the control of the NATO Stabilisation Force 
(SFOR) in BiH under the name European Union Force (EUFOR) operation “Althea”. 
The mission was to fulfil the role of the Dayton agreement from 1995 and to 
contribute to a safe and secure environment in BiH (Quille:2004). With its mandate 
and size, EUFOR confirmed that the EU now had become a security policy actor with 
the possibilities of command and control over a relatively large military force. 
                                                 
48 The agency is designed: “to support the Member states in their effort to improve European defence capabilities in the field 
of crisis management and to sustain the ESDP as it stands now and develops in the future” (European Council:2004:1) 
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4. ANALYSIS IN A NEO-REALIST PERSPECTIVE 
 
“The pre-eminence of American power today is unprecedented in modern history” 
(Ikenberry:2002:1) 
 
In the unipolar world with American dominance and hegemony which emerged after 
the Cold War, some neo-realist scholars have expected that the great powers in the 
world would try to counterbalance the US hegemony. However, few believed when the 
Cold War ended that the EU would be able to do this. In fact, realist theorists like John 
Mearsheimer (1990) believed that the EU would be dissolved or at least 
marginalised49. On the other hand, neo-liberal intuitionalists like Keohane (1993) 
believed that the EU would grow even stronger and that integration would continue. 
Still, Keohane never saw the EU as becoming an equal partner or rival to the US. 
 
In this chapter I will seek to analyse the change of ESDP after 9/11 using a modified 
neo-realistic perspective of the international system. In support of the claim that a 
policy change occurred in US foreign and security policy after 9/11, I will briefly refer 
to official documents and speeches from the US government. At the same time I will 
present the differences between Europe and the US in their strategic culture. Secondly, 
I will show the European response to the new US foreign and security policy analysing 
the events that happened during the transatlantic crisis before the Iraq war, and of 
course the crisis and war in Iraq itself which perhaps exemplifies the contrast between 
the US and Europe and thus gives and indication that Europe tried to counterbalance 
the US. The greatest indication of the European counterbalance efforts will be found in 
official strategies, hence the ESS and US National Security Strategy (NSS) will be 
analysed and compared. Finally, in the last part of this chapter I will discuss whether 




                                                 
49 Even in the book “The tragedy of Great Power Politics” (2001), Mearsheimer do not see the EU as a potential challenger 
to US hegemony. However, Mearsheimer wrote his book before the events of 9/11. 
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4.1 US new foreign and security policy  
Neo-conservatism became the common label on the policy rationale of American 
hegemony as the future global order after 9/11. The idea was to promote American 
liberal values to the rest of the world, if necessary with the use of military force50. It 
became a return to “Reaganism”, were military power and traditional American values 
provided the ingredients. In a simplified form, neo-conservatism was based on three 
basic assumptions: 1) The US is a superpower, must act as a superpower and should 
prevent other regional great powers to become opposite power poles, 2) Realism and 
idealism are intrinsically linked because American hegemony and power cannot be 
based on material interests and territorial control alone. The US must therefore 
confront autocratic regimes and shape global development, 3) Threats are 
unpredictable and latent, especially in what may be termed as rogue states. Therefore 
the US cannot sit and wait for potential enemies to obtain Weapons of Mass-
destruction (WMD), but must confront the states with appearance or intentions to do 
so (Thune:2003:183)51. 
In the neo-conservative view the state-centric Westphalian order is turned upside-
down. States are legitimate or ill-legitimate, not sovereign. State sovereignty is 
dependent on how the state is organised and only democracies are legitimate. Security 
in this view presumes that unless the world changes to meet American security needs, 
America will have to react to an international order which is no longer updated to 
restore order and fulfil American security needs (Ibid:2003:183-184). The new 
American unilateralism made one set of rules for the US and one set of rules for the 
others (Hagtvet:2003:89). 
 
 “America did not change on 9/11, it only became more itself” (Kagan:2003:85). 
                                                 
50 Using American power unilateral was not a new policy. The Clinton administration used US unilateral power in Iraq, 
Afghanistan and Sudan and the forces deployed in Kosovo was a NATO operation but without the UN mandate 
(Johansen:2004:10). Already in 1998 the Congress decided on the liberation act ; “US policy should be to remove Saddam 
Hussein’s regime from power in Iraq” (Thune:2003). However, pre-emptive warfare was never formerly a part of US policy. 
51 These political views had been a result of a long intellectual debate in the US. The former democrat William Kristol and 
Fred Barnes were editors of the magazine called “The Weekly standard” were these views were asserted long before Bush II 
came to power (first issue published in 1995). The ideas started already in 1992 where key actors like former vice defence 
secretary Wolfowitz and Vice president Cheney (in 1992 he was secretary of defence) made an important report on how to 
use American power unilateral after the success of the Gulf War. However, these plans diminished when Bush I lost the 
election in 1992. During the 1990s an organisation which called itself “Project For a New American Century” (PNAC) 
aggregated some of the same views which we now know from the label neo-conservatism (Thune:2003:183) 
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One of the first political effects of 9/11 was a redefinition of US foreign and security 
policy (Melby:2004:94). The first changes came immediately as a reaction to the 
attacks on 9/11. America’s goal became to hunt and destroy “terrorists and those who 
harbour them” (Bush:2001a). Making the campaign against terror into a “war” against 
terror facilitated the policy link between terrorist organisations and regimes, as the US 
did in Afghanistan, but also for any future actions against other states suspected to 
harbour terrorists52.  It was first in the State of the Union speech in January 2002 that 
the world was given signals on a new unprecedented unilateral US foreign policy. 
President Bush spoke about the “axis of evil” and made couplings between WMD and 
“rogue states”, especially mentioning Iraq (Bush:2002a)53. However, the major official 
policy change came with Bush’s famous speech at West Point on 01 June 2002. This 
was the first time the concept “pre-emptive” warfare was used:  
“And our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready 
for pre-emptive action when necessary to defend our liberties and our lives” (Bush:2002b).  
  
Almost a year after 9/11 the right of pre-emptive warfare was not just politically 
acceptable, it became a demand from the opposition (Melby:2004:98). The efforts to 
combine terrorists and states, and hence promoting why pre-emptive strikes should be 
used continued in an official speech by Vice President Cheney in august 2002. This 
time the right to use pre-emptive measures was more or less directed towards Saddam 
Hussein’s regime in Iraq54. Another example of a definitive change in foreign and 
security policy was Defence Secretary Rumsfeld’s annual report to Congress in august 
2002 (Rumsfeld:2002)55. 
                                                 
52 According to Melby (2003:145), one of the main problems of terrorism was its asymmetric perspectives. However, making 
a coupling between states and terrorists it was indirectly possible to do something with the problem of terror using traditional 
military tools. 
53 “Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror”[…] “States like these, and their terrorists allies 
, constitute an axis of evil[…]” (Bush:2002a) 
54 From Cheney’s speech :“There is a terrorist underworld out there, spread among more than 60 countries”, “And 
containment [about WMD] is not possible when dictators obtain weapons of mass destruction, and are prepared to share them 
with terrorists […]”, the same dictator [about Saddam Hussein] who has been on the State Department’s list of state sponsors 
of terrorism for the better part of two decades”, “Deliverable weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a terror network, or 
a murderous dictator, or the two working together, constitutes as grave a threat as can be imagined. The risks of inaction are 
far greater than the risk of action” (Cheney:2002). 
55 From Rumsfeld’s report: “U.S. forces must maintain the capability, at the direction of the president, to impose the will of 
the United States and its  coalition partners on any adversaries, including states or non-state entities. Such a decisive defeat 
could include changing the regime of an adversary state or occupation of foreign territory until U.S. strategic objectives are 
met” (Rumsfeld:2002:19). 
 36
In the winter of 2002/2003 the Iraq crisis and the new American policy had created 
strong transatlantic tensions. These tensions worsened when Rumsfeld referred to 
Germany and France as “old Europe” on a press conference 22nd of January 2003 
(Rumsfeld:2003a)56, trying to rule and divide the European countries on the case of 
Iraq. In the State of the Union speech held only one week later, most of the attention 
was given to the leading role of the US making unilateral action necessary, the future 
intervention in Iraq and coupling terrorists and WMD with Saddam Hussein’s regime 
(Bush:2003)57. From merely being reaffirmed when the Bush administration came into 
office, the traditional neo-conservative concepts now enjoyed a monopoly in the 
official US policy (Biscop:2004:12). Approximately one month after the war in Iraq 
was declared over by Bush, Rumsfeld held a new speech where he again discredited 
the European countries opposing the war in Iraq58. In the State of the Union speech in 
2004, Bush did not mention NATO for the first time in the history of State of the 
Union speeches since the alliance was established in 1949. Instead the unilateral policy 
was continued and Bush used the frame “our international allies” (Bush:2004).  
The official policy in the Bush administration was backed by international unilateral 
action and politics: The focus on the rocket shield, the attitudes towards the Kyoto 
protocol and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) agreement, the Ban of landmines 
treaty and of course the rejection of the International Criminal Court (ICC)59. The 
treatment of the suspected terrorists at Guantanamo bay reinforced this impression; 
especially in Europe, that international law did not apply for the powerful, but for 
everyone else. 
Furthermore, the Bush administration increased an already high military budget, from 
$288 billion in 2000 to $420 billion in 2005 (Shah:2004). Already at the end of the 
                                                 
56 Rumsfeld 22 January 2003 : “Germany has been a problem and France has been a problem. But you look at the vast 
numbers of other countries in Europe, they’re not with France and Germany […] they’re with the US”. “You are thinking of 
Europe as Germany and France. I don’t. I think that’s old Europe” (Rumsfeld:2003a) 
57 State of the Union 2003 : “Yet the course of this nation does not depend on the decision of others. Whatever action is 
required, whenever action is necessary, I will defend the freedom and security of the American people” Making coupling 
between Saddam Hussein and the terrorists of 9/11 : “Imagine those 19 hijackers with other weapons and other plans, this 
time armed by Saddam Hussein” (Bush:2003) 
58 Rumsfeld in his speech in the George C Marshall European Centre For Security Studies 11th of June 2003 : 
“It suggests that the distinction between old and new in Europe today is really not a matter of age or size or geography. It's 
really a matter of attitude -- of the vision that countries bring to the transatlantic relationship and to the challenges that we 
will all face in the years ahead” (Rumsfeld:2003b). 
59 The rejection of the ICC became a small international crisis in 2002. Although this was a continuation of the Clinton 
administration policy, in 2002 the US had declared “war” against the ICC accompanied by threats of sanctions against allies 
who ratified it (Hoffman:2004:15). The US also vetoed the six month extension of the UN’s Bosnia mission as an effort to 
block the plans of ratifying the ICC. 
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1990s US military budgets were 40% of the entire world countries collective budgets 
and the US finances about ¾ of the worlds military research budgets. At the same 
time, the development in what is known as Revolution in Military affairs (RMA) gave 
the US a political applicable military force and strengthened the US relative power 
position in the world (Melby:2004:29). Whereas the EU consists of 450 million 
people, the collective military budgets of all the member states are $220 billion, while 
the US military budget is $400 billion60. 
  
4.2 European response to the aftermath of 9/11 
“What we want is more Europe, not less America” (Solana:2003a). 
 
At first, the reactions to the 9/11 attacks in Europe represented a unified support to the 
Americans. Sentiments in Europe were exemplified by the front page of Le Monde two 
days after the attack: “We are all Americans”61. The member states of the EU reacted 
jointly to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and all the NATO members immediately issued a 
statement saying that the terrorist attack was to be treated as an Article V incident. 
However, most EU members had a different view than the Americans on how to fight 
terrorism. The extraordinary European Council meeting 21st Sept 2001 called for :  
“an in-depth political dialogue with those countries and regions of the world in which 
terrorism comes into being” and “the integration of all countries into a fair world system of 
security, prosperity and improved development” (Cited in Biscop:2004: 4).  
 
As 9/11 became a turning point for the American foreign and security policy, the 
terrorist attacks did not prove a similar change of strategy for EU external action, 
despite the unanimous support to the Americans. Rather, it served to solidify the 
European view that a policy that focuses exclusively on military instruments cannot 
achieve long-term stability or ensure national security. The EU’s effort to try a 
differentiated response, focusing on the underlying causes of terrorism, was another 
example of the comprehensive approach, and with regard to enhancing the ESDP it 
                                                 
60 In the SIPRI yearbook for 2003 the estimates are $220 billion for EU and $400 billion for US (Everts & Keohane:2004:3). 
Kagan (2003:69) operates with the figures $180 billion for Europe, and $400 billion for USA. In a calculation using figures 
from CIA World Fact Book in April 2005 (CIA:2005) the figures are $203,5 billion for Europe and 370,7 for the US. 
However, several of the figures in the fact-book are from 2003 or earlier. 
61 Le Monde 13/9 2001 : ”Nous sommes tous Americaines”. 
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seemed that 9/11 itself only accelerated evolutions that were already put in motion by 
the EU’s experience from the Balkans (Ibid:2004:4). The war in Afghanistan was 
largely supported by the EU member countries62. Although the coupling between 
states and terrorists was performed already before the war in Afghanistan, the US 
gained massive support for “Operation Enduring Freedom” even though it was 
conducted without a UN mandate mainly as it was seen as a response to a direct attack. 
However, the ISAF stabilisation force were given a UN mandate and also supported by 
the EU.  
Following the logic of balance of threat theory it seems that Europe did not yet see the 
need to power balance the US. However, the signals from the Bush administration 
during the summer and fall in 2002, especially the rejection of international 
cooperation through institutions and regimes were to change this attitude. 
 
4.2.1 Berlin plus, NATO crisis and transatlantic relations 
Although the EU decided to declare the ESDP operational in December 2001, the 
decision was a result of the obligations made at the Helsinki summit more than it was 
an attempt to countermeasure against the Americans. The transatlantic relations 
hardened during the spring of 2002, yet there were no signals either in official EU 
policy or by the member states that action was needed to counterbalance the US. The 
situation might have been uncomfortable but not intolerable. This appeared to change 
during the summer and fall of 2002. As the official US policy introduced the ability to 
use pre-emptive warfare without a UN mandate, it is likely that the Europeans 
interpreted this new agenda as “aggressive intentions”. These aggressive intentions 
would undermine the great powers in Europe’s ability to maximize their own interests 
through the multilateral institutions, hence a stronger alliance among the countries of 
Europe was formed to counterbalance the superpower and regain some of the lost 
influence. At the NATO summit in Prague in November 2002, the US launched an 
initiative to create a NATO response force (NRF)63. It is possible to deduce, at least if 
                                                 
62 During the operation “Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan 2001/2002 13 EU countries contributed with about 5000 troops 
to the ISAF peacekeeping force (Matlary:2003:112), and several countries provided with special forces to the US led task 
force in the fighting against the Taliban. 
63 The NRF is expected to achieve full operational readiness in October 2006. The NRF is a strike force to conduct high-
intensity combat operations far from NATO shores. The ERRF, by contrast, is principally aimed at carrying out stability 
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one follows the logic of neo-realism, that the US wanted to build a competitor to the 
ERRF decided upon at Helsinki, or at least to undermine the EU’s efforts to construct 
their own military capabilities. However, the NRF was dependent on European 
contribution and the European NATO countries also approved the creation of the 
force. Literarily, the NRF came under American control, the opposite of its 
counterpart, the ERRF64. At the same meeting all the NATO countries decided on the 
provisions of the later Berlin plus accords (NATO:2002b), although the accord was 
not formalised before 16th of December 2002 and ratified in March 2003. What 
seemed to be at stake for the European countries was a shift in the distribution of 
power. To let the US control and have the possibility to veto the use of NRF, and more 
or less let the NRF become a “tool in the toolbox” for the US conducting its pre-
emptive warfare, seemed not to be in most European countries interest. It is therefore 
likely that the Berlin plus agreements again were Europe’s effort to regain the 
initiative by letting the EU use NATO assets and capabilities in order to conduct 
operations independently, without American influence.65  
The transatlantic crisis culminated in February 2003 when Turkey invoked the art IV 
of the North Atlantic Treaty to have consultations with the other NATO members 
because of the situation of Iraq. Germany, France and Belgium refused to accept the 
obligation to protect Turkey against Iraqi aggression in the case of a US-led attack of 
Iraq from Turkish soil (NATO: 2003). 
Finally, the NATO members reached a shaky consensus on the issue 
(Robertson:2003), but it was not what the US had wished for and the crisis was the 
first of its kind in the history of the alliance. A month later (17 March 2003) the Berlin 
plus accords were adopted and less than two weeks later the first autonomous EU 
operation was put to play. Although “Operation Concordia” was of a small scale (only 
350 soldiers), the signal that the EU was able to conduct operations independently 
                                                                                                                                                        
operations on Europe’s periphery (Larrabe:2004:8, Everts & Keohane: 2004:5). According to Gnesetto (2003) the NRF 
became a duplication of the European achievements of European defence, hence the NRF was an effort to weaken the 
European development.  
64 The NRF is also more or less a European project, where Britain, France Spain and Germany are the main contributors 
while US only participates symbolically (Everts & Keohane:2004:12). 
65 Previous problems in conducting EU operations with NATO assets and capabilities were not a result of an American 
rejection, but a result of a veto from Turkey (Bailes:2003:32). 
 40
seemed to respond directly to the American unilateral action during the crisis and war 
in Iraq, which commenced on 20 March66.  
In October 2003 the NATO exercise “Dynamic response 2007” was conducted lead by 
US Defence Secretary Rumsfeld. The theme of the exercise was a military intervention 
in a country in the Middle East. The country was not named, but experts have 
suggested that it was an exercise on an intervention in Syria or Iran. The Europeans 
reacted with strong scepticism to how the exercise was conducted. The main problem 
was that the military action was preventive or more precisely, pre-emptive. Another 
reason for strong European reactions to the exercise was that the member states of 
NATO that did not want to participate should not use their right to veto 
(Johansen:2004:21). On the 17th of October, at an EU Council meeting on the draft 
Constitution, Britain moved further than ever before towards accepting the need for a 
tighter EU structured cooperation on security and defence (Howorth:2003:13), 
indicating a British shift in preferences in close connection with the reaffirmation of 
US policy.  
 
4.2.2 Strengthening ESDP – The EU making its operations 
The changed US foreign and security policy contributed to the acceleration of ESDP67. 
It reinforced Europe’s desire to look after its own security and hedge against a 
weakening of US interest in NATO and the transatlantic relationship 
(Larrabee:2004:2). For the EU, one of the major challenges became how to react to the 
US superpower now wearing new clothing and with a changed attitude. Many 
Europeans felt that the EU could not have a serious foreign policy without a credible 
defence component. Several EU members, particularly France and Germany, wanted 
to have a “core group” to have the ability to proceed with closer defence cooperation, 
and if necessary, ahead of other EU members68. At the end of April 2003 France, 
Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg had a mini summit in Brussels. The most eminent 
result of this summit was the proposal of a separate EU operational planning 
                                                 
66 Another argument is that a strong ESDP could lead to the formation of a European caucus or a European pillar in NATO 
(Larrabee:2004) 
67 This view is also supported by Bono (2004:445-46). 
68 In this context it was quite surprising that turning ISAF in Afghanistan into a NATO operation, which was decided by the 
NATO Council on 16th of April, the request to increase NATO’s role, actually came from Germany (along with Netherlands 
and Canada (Brodeur: 2003) 
 41
headquarters in Tervuren, which of course provoked a strong reaction from 
Washington (Ibid:2004). Most EU operations would need to draw on NATO assets 
under the Berlin plus arrangement, and therefore the proposal to make an autonomous 
EU operational headquarter was one more step in the direction of signalling balancing 
tendencies. The proposal, however, was defused (Howorth:2003:13) and this was 
mainly a result of the mediation of Tony Blair (Larrabee:2004:1)69.  
On 1 May 2003 the war in Iraq was officially declared over by Bush. Even though the 
attempt to produce an autonomous ESDP headquarter had failed at the end of April, 
the first EU operation without use of NATO assets, capabilities and command 
structure was launched in June. Answering the UN’s call for action in the Congo, 
France took initiative to form an EU led operation which were to protect the civilians 
in the city of Bunia in the Ituri province70. Although the mission became more or less a 
symbol on ESDP success, critics have claimed that the size of the force (1400) and the 
time period it was deployed (4 months) indicate that it was a very small operation 
where a large majority of the forces were French71. Thus, a comparison with NATO or 
the US might not be in place. Nevertheless, the operation was certainly on the upper 
scale of high-risks interventions, and demonstrated that the EU could act rapidly and 
decisively in the presence of political will (Biscop:2004:5). Apart from the 
construction of the ESS, another signal of this course from the EU was given in the 
ESDP presidency report issued in December 2003 where the need for the EU to 
enhance capabilities at the upper end of the conflict spectrum was noted (European 
Council 2003b) 
In the EU as well as in the US, the attacks on 9/11 brought about a certain renewed 
emphasis on defence (Biscop:2004:12). The first examples of this effect were the so-
                                                 
69 Making a military headquarter for the EU would make the organisation a rival to NATO and not a complement. However, 
the difference in military capabilities between NATO and ESDP are tremendous. While NATO consists of 2000 people in 
SHAPE, and NATO having regional headquarters in Italy, Netherlands and the US, the EUMS only consists of 200 staff 
officers in Brussels (Everts & Keohane:2004:12). For the EU to become a security policy actor with at least the same 
capabilities as NATO, the proposal of the Tervuren headquarter was an attempt of the first important step.  
70 A long term French strategy has been to strengthen European security policy with the EU as its core 
(Matlary:2003:112/113).  
71 At the same time it seemed more like the French wanted to give the impression that the ESDP had overcome its problem 
with lacking hard power capability, although critics would say that a comparison with British unilateral intervention in Sierra 
Leone and French intervention in the Ivory Coast were almost the same as the operation “Artemis” with the exception that 
some EU and non-EU countries supported the operation with special forces. 
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called collective defence clause which was prepared by the Convention, later it was 
found in the final adoption of the Constitution:  
“If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member states 
shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means of their power 
[…]”(Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (2004), art 41, part 7)72.  
 
The controversy over this clause considered its interpretation of the EU as alternative 
to NATO. However, at the present time the EU does not have the capacity for 
collective defence, thus the issue is largely theoretical. There is also the important 
question of what kind of assistance or military aid the member states have to 
contribute. Nevertheless, the collective defence clause was an effort to strengthen the 
status of the ESDP among the member states, something which was reinforced with 
the reference to a mutual defence in the Constitution. 
In many ways, these and several other specific provisions in the Constitutional Treaty 
showed an EU more offensive than ever before in the domain of security policy. 
However, the major problem of EU security policy in the past had been its credibility 
to perform “action on the ground”. During 2003 and especially 2004 the EU should 
prove otherwise. Besides the military operations in Macedonia and Congo, the EU had 
also launched two police missions in the former Yugoslavia. In 2004 the EU met most 
of earlier criticism with the construction of the battle groups concept and the take-over 
of SFOR in December 2004. The idea that EU was unable to conduct high risk large 
military operations over time was rejected and disproved. 
The unilateralist approach of the US reinforced the EU member states will to develop a 
more autonomous ESDP outside NATO and a stronger European defence component 
was seen by many as a prerequisite for a more equal partnership with the US 
(Larrabee:2004). Balancing the US became not the traditional bipolar balancing of 
power which was eminent during the Cold War. In 2003 and 2004 it became a 
European effort to transform its military forces into deployable forces which could be 
used around the globe. Europe’s main problem was not a lack of peacekeepers, but a 
lack of deployable forces. Europe has over 1.7 million men and women under arms, 
                                                 
72 In the work in the Convention Working Group VIII (2002) stated in its final report in December 2002: “Such a collective 
defence clause was considered unacceptable by some members […]”. Yet, the Constitution which was signed in June 2004 
adopted the collective defence clause. There was obviously a change of preference for some member states between 
December 2002 and June 2004. However, the article emphasised a formulation of non-prejudice towards NATO. 
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but only 10% of those forces are deployable abroad (Larrabe:2004:9)73. Europe needed 
a transformation. Some Europeans argue that the resources for this transformation can 
only be found if EU members no longer organise their defence nationally but strive for 
a European defence. European defence integration, they maintain, will help Europe 
rationalise its defence procurement policies and overcome its inefficient defence 
spending. In June 2004 the EDA was constructed to enhance these capabilities among 
the EU member states.  
 
4.2.3 Iraqi crisis and changes in the structure 
The invasion of Iraq started already on 12th of December 2001. That is, the first time it 
was suggested that Iraq should be invaded was in a meeting at the US National 
Security Council on that day (Thune:2003:57). However, it was not until the 20th of 
March 2003 that the actual invasion took place. In the period from Sept 12th 2001 and 
even beyond the end of the war in Iraq on 1 May 2003, the case of Iraq became one of 
the main reasons for the transatlantic divide, thus contributing to a European effort to 
balance the superpower. The divide between the EU countries on support or resistance 
to the American invasion plans started already in March 2002 when Bush and Blair 
held the so called “war summit on Iraq”, and the plans to invade Iraq were meant to be 
completed on 15 April 2002 (Thune:2003:35). This was four months before the US 
National Security Strategy (NSS) became published as official policy. 
The case of Iraq became a disagreement over the extent to which Iraq really posed a 
threat and the legitimacy of a military intervention. The American attitude, 
exemplified by official rhetoric, did not drift the EU away from earlier views on 
legitimacy and multilateralism as official policy74, merely it divided the EU member 
states on whether to follow or oppose the unilateral superpower. When the EU had 
                                                 
73 Most of these troops are incapable of operating in a coalition with US forces in high-intensity conflicts – one reason why 
the US preferred to conduct the Afghanistan campaign with a select group of allies rather than through NATO. The US 
wanted to avoid “war in committees” which had happened during the Kosovo campaign. 
74 Javier Solana speech at Harvard, April 7th 2003: ” […] we tackle cause and not just symptoms, […] we act together to 
sustain a world based on rule” “Upholding and strengthening the rule of law is the best means for America to preserve her 
position as the benign world power and to continue to project her values”. “[…]it would be a mistake for the US to ‘cherry 
pick’ from among its European allies”. “A policy of ’divide and rule’ would become ‘divide and fail’. (Solana:2003b,). This 
policy was continued in speeches in August and September, even after the Iraqi war : “The European Union needs to fulfil its 
responsibilities as a global actor” (Solana:2003d) “We have a commitment to disarm Saddam Hussein, and we have a 
commitment to do it through the United Nations” (Solana:2003e) , and: “The EU’s action on the last years has had its main 
goal the strengthening of what we have agreed to call effective multilateralism, with the UN at its heart” (Solana:2003f) 
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been confronted with such crises in the past, such as in Bosnia and Kosovo, the 
member states had shown equal difficulties in reaching a consensus on how to respond 
and which instruments to use (Biscop:2004:4).  
While the Iraqi crisis exposed deep divisions within Europe over security policy and 
transatlantic relations, it also spurred new efforts to develop a stronger security and 
defence policy (Larrabee:2004:2-3). In the European subsystem, France had replaced 
the US as Germany’s most important ally. This structural change goes beyond the case 
of Iraq and is a major reason for the fronting of ESDP as an effort to balance the US. 
However, the case of Iraq and the reactions to US foreign and security policy became 
the trigger which released the structural change exemplified by the French, German 
and Belgian push for “structured cooperation in defence” within the EU (Ibid:2004). 
Undoubtedly, 9/11 and Iraq influenced the member states to consider new strategic 
thinking that was impossible when ESDP was created just a few years earlier. For 
some this strategic thinking included a distinctive “European way”, for others it meant 
to preserve the transatlantic partnership (Biscop:2004:5). 
At first, the Iraq crisis served to marginalise the EU as a foreign policy actor. The 
incident became a return of the nation-state era in Europe. On the 22 January 2003 
Chirac and Schroeder issued a statement where the two leaders declared their 
opposition against the war (Aftenposten:2003a). On the 30 January, Britain, Italy, 
Spain, Portugal and Denmark signed a support letter to the US which was also signed 
by the NATO countries and upcoming EU members Hungary, Poland and the Czech 
Republic. On the 05 February 2003 the ten countries of the so-called Vilnius group of 
EU applying members also gave their support to the US (Orban:2004:49). At an 
extraordinary meeting on 17 February 2003 the European Council did state: “that 
force should be used only as a last resort” (European Council:2003a) and emphasised 
the importance of reinvigorating the Middle East peace process if peace and stability 
are to be brought to the region. Although the status quo EU member states supported 
the US, the European declaration proved that the same countries did not leave the 
multilateral approach of the EU. Europe agreed that Saddam had to be removed; the 
divide was about how to do it. However, the Europeans did not unite for or against the 
unilateral superpower, they divided themselves on each side of the transatlantic fence 
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(Orban:2004:36-38). It seemed that the American tactic on divide et imperia had 
succeeded in weakening the EU in the question of Iraq.  Even though the Union was 
divided the emphasis on multilateralism and legitimacy was still the official policy 
(see footnote no. 74). 
 
4.2.4 The case of Iraq and the great powers of Europe 
In the crisis of Iraq the three great powers of Europe reacted differently. France had 
been an antagonist opposing US power throughout the Cold War (especially during the 
presidency of DeGaulle). France had been the foremost speaker for the WEU and also 
for strengthening European defence capabilities during the Cold War. Yet, during the 
1990s there were very few open confrontations between France and the US 
(Haine:2004:42). However, France worked intensively during the post Cold war era 
for deeper defence integration within the EU where the country could take a leading 
role. Nevertheless, it was the changed US policy after 9/11 which made France to 
strengthen its earlier antagonist policy towards the US. In many ways this attitude can 
be analysed in a neo-realist perspective where the great power now were losing 
influence in the international system to a superpower with aggressive intentions.  
France’s reaction to the Iraq crisis had three implications. First, France wanted to 
maximize its own national interests in Iraq. France was the third largest importer of oil 
from Iraq in 2002 (Orban:2004:14). Strategically and economically, Iraq was 
important for the French. Second, the fear of more terrorism as a result of an invasion 
was eminent. At the same time, Chirac needed to reinforce his status from weak 
president (which was the result of the election in 1997) to a “strong” president. The 
“Gaullistic” values like independence and influence for France was important in this 
phase (Orban:2004:15). Third, the anti-Americanism in France is seen as a driving 
power behind the French diplomatic positioning during the Iraq crisis. Both the left 
and right of the political landscape in France have traditions for anti-Americanism and 
with the unilateral change of US foreign policy after 9/11 the US was seen more as a 
direct threat toward French interests75.  
                                                 
75 In a poll made for Le Monde, 65% of the French felt that US and Britain was responsible for the war in Iraq, and 74 % of 
the French felt that Chirac had not gone far enough in his critique of the war (Orban:2004:45). Foreign minister De Villepin 
in a speech in IISS in London 27 March 2003 : “We do not oppose the use of force. We are only warning against the risk of 
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The British attitudes toward Iraq were the story of riding two horses. On the one hand, 
Britain did not want to loose its “special relationship”76 with the US, on the other, 
Britain did not want to be outdistanced or left behind in the evolution of the ESDP, or 
in the integration process in general. Despite the polls showing a growing opposition 
to a war in Iraq (Aftenposten:2003c), Blair supported his American allied although 
British official statements tried to focus on multilateral means of cooperation and a 
UN mandate for the intervention. As a declining great power Britain had come to 
believe in the importance of the idea of international community or society. 
(Hill:2004:3). Britain behaved like Morgenthau’s status quo state supporting the 
superpower as it seemed to be in its own interest.  
As a former status quo state; Germany turned into an antagonist opposing the US 
during the crisis in Iraq. A major reason for the German pacifistic attitude towards the 
case of Iraq has been the focus on a re-election of Chancellor Schroeder. Strong public 
opinions gave the chancellor support for this view (Matlary:2003:101). There were 
also rational and realistic arguments to the German policy. By opposing the US in the 
Middle East, Germany, as well as France, could gain stronger influence on the world’s 
most important oil region. In trying to balance the power of the hegemon, French and 
German official policy became the opposite of the US in the UN Security Council. 
While US wanted to invade, France and Germany wanted to keep up the inspections. 
At the same time this lead to a much harder climate between the two and the US. 
Following previous policy, from NSS and other official channels, the US attitude was 
that no single country in the UN Security Council should decide whether or not the US 
should “protect themselves” (Ibid:2003:102). 
 
4.3 European Security Strategy (ESS) 
The story of the ESS began with the informal meeting of the foreign ministers of the 
EU at Kastellorizo on the island of Rhodes, on 2-3 May 2003. This was the day after 
the war in Iraq was declared over. Rather unexpectedly (Biscop:2004:6), Javier Solana 
                                                                                                                                                        
pre-emptive strikes as a doctrine. What example are we setting for other countries? How legitimate would we feel such an 
action to be? What are our limits to the use of such might? In endorsing this doctrine, we would risk introducing the principle 
of constant instability and uncertainty. We risk not controlling situations and rushing headlong into action. Let us not open 
Pandora’s box” (De Villepin:2003). 
76 After the Suez crisis in 1956 British foreign policy has followed the pattern of supporting the US (Lundestad:2003). 
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was mandated to produce a “European Security strategy concept” and present it to the 
next European Council in Tessaloniki in June77. The member states of the EU, and 
especially France and Britain, had used strong efforts in trying to build the EU as a 
robust and coherent security policy actor even since St Malo in 1998, only to see that 
the same mistakes which happened on the Balkans, happened again during the Iraq 
crisis. The member states would have to find a set of fundamental principles to which 
all could agree, so that for the next crisis the EU could behave as an effective 
international actor; the consensus would be embedded in a written strategy to guide the 
Union’s action78. The undermining of CFSP/ESDP and Solana’s role during the Iraq 
crisis was something which the member states now tried to remedy. In fact, the 
member states had spent years and years on negotiating the provisions for CFSP/ESDP 
and at the first crisis they were not able to use the tools which they themselves had 
created. Britain and France, prominent advocates of the ESDP, were now leading 
opposing camps. Faced with the initiatives of a dominant global player, which 
possessed an explicit strategy, the NSS, the EU was in dire need of a clear strategy of 
its own to attain credibility in the global arena (Biscop:2004:2). Therefore it seemed 
logical that the initiatives to form a European strategy came the day after the war in 
Iraq was over79. 
The question is still; why was the ESS made? There are several reasons and historical 
events that influenced the process. Pointing only on US foreign and security policy 
after 9/11, the case of Iraq and Europe’s need to power balance the US would not be 
sufficient. First of all, the upcoming enlargement of the EU forced a common strategic 
fundament for the organisation80. Second, the need to define and clarify the goal of 
EU’s security policy had increased as both ESDP and CFSP had evolved. In May 
2003, when the initiative was taken, the EU was already undergoing two of its 
                                                 
77 “The immediate background and motivation of the formulation of the ESS was the aftermath of the Iraq crisis, which 
produced a divide both among Europeans and the US” (Biscop:2004:7). “The idea of the mandate was pushed by France, 
Germany and the UK as part of their general attempt to regroup after the Iraq-related split” (Bailes:2005:11). 
78 In the words of Commissioner Pascal Lamy: “No state, no national parliament would accept to act through the Union if the 
debate on objectives and principles has not taken place” (Cited in Biscop:2004:5) 
79 “One of the main reasons why the EU was so divided in the case of Iraq was its lack of strategic reasoning. By contrast, a 
majority of member states addressed the issues through political motives, some internal, some external, which led to a merely 
reactive policy. There was also a recognition that a divided Europe would be powerless” (Haine:2004:50) 
80 The 10 new Central and Eastern European and Mediterranean countries might have tried to tilt the policy balances in a pro- 
US direction or make ESDP consensus building mechanically more difficult. Having all 25 states of the larger EU pre-
committed to the ESS would offer at least one defence against this (Bailes:2005:10). 
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operations and was planning for two more. Third, to become a credible international 
security policy actor the EU needed to have a strategy which could response to both 
the NSS and NATO strategic concept. Fourth, The Iraq crisis illuminated the desperate 
need for a common strategic concept in Europe. A strategy would provide a clear 
framework for policymaking and would thus render unilateral action amongst the 
states in the EU more difficult (Tofte:2004:2, Bailes:2005:10).  
 
“The adoption of the Strategy is a major step for EU external action, a step which until the 
Iraq crisis was quite unimaginable” (Biscop:2004:35).  
 
4.3.1 European Security Strategy vs. US National Security Strategy 
“The end of the Cold War has left the United States in a dominant position as a military 
actor” (ESS:1). 
 
“[…]our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA” (ESS:13) 
 
Was Europe to take the same course as the US, or was this first ever combined security 
strategy in Europe an effort to show the US that Europe no longer wanted to be 
dictated by the superpower and restructure a course of its own? It seemed obvious after 
the Iraq divide that Europe could not be united either on an anti-US or a pro-US 
platform. The key was to define what Europe itself wanted and needed (Bailes:2005: 
24) by restoring a sense of common purpose in Europe while not provoking a 
worsening of the transatlantic crisis. Most important, starting to use strategic language, 
the EU took one more step into the international arena as an actor.  
 
A pivotal difference between the two strategies is found in the perception of how to 
respond to threats. In the NSS threats and enemies are the dominant theme throughout 
the strategy. The NSS defines that terrorists, WMD and “rogue states” consists the 
gravest danger to US security (NSS:5) Although the phrase “axis of evil” is not used in 
the NSS, Iraq and North Korea are mentioned as examples of “rogue states”. The 
biggest threat according to the NSS is “an alliance of terror and tyrants” and the 
greatest danger to freedom lies in the denial of the threat of terrorism/rogue states or 
the failure to act against it (NSS:Chapter V). For the ESS threats are not the dominant 
theme in the strategy and the words “enemies” and “rogue” are not used. Where the 
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NSS defines the biggest threats as terrorists, WMD and “rogue” states or rogue states 
acquiring WMD, the ESS defines terrorists, WMD, failed states, organised crime and 
regional conflicts as the biggest threats. The ESS acknowledges that the phenomenon 
of terrorism is also a part of our societies; the NSS do not mention this at all. 
Furthermore, the ESS identifies the causes behind terrorism as economic and social 
insecurity (ESS:3) and when summarising the problem of “failed states”, Afghanistan, 
Liberia and Somalia are mentioned as examples (ESS:4, 7)81. 
 
While the NSS focus on the importance of pre-emptive strikes as eminent to meet the 
threats82, the ESS uses the phrase preventive83 :  
“The first line of defence will be abroad” (ESS:7) and “The best protection for our security is 
a world of well governed democratic states” (ESS:10).  
 
The ESS and NSS differ strongly on the view of military action. Where the NSS focus 
on the need to use military force to meet the threats84 (Biscop:2004:28), the only 
reason for using military action according to the ESS is in connection with failed 
states, and intervention should be used to put failed states back on their feet (ESS:6). 
Military means alone solve nothing (ESS:7). Although the comprehensive security 
approach is continued in the ESS, the strategy also acknowledges the need for the EU 
to obtain military capabilities on the upper high risk scale (ESS:11-12). 
Another important difference between the two strategies is found in their views on 
multilateralism and unilateralism. Not surprisingly, the NSS follows the same line of 
the Bush administration rhetoric earlier in 2002 : “we will be prepared to act apart 
when our interests and unique responsibilities require” (Bailes:2005:15). There is no 
talk of multilateralism and little mentioning of the UN system as a general framework 
for action. Cooperation is based on “American internationalism” and the NSS openly 
rejects all international constraints. For instance, an entire paragraph is used on 
                                                 
81 “According to the NSS the world is dangerous, according to the ESS the world is complex” (Biscop:2004:28). 
82”[…] we will not hesitate to act alone if necessary, to exercise our right to self-defence by acting pre-emptively […]” and  
”[…] the only path to peace and security is the path of action” and ”as a matter of common sense and self defence, America 
will act against such threats before they are fully formed. We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best” 
(NSS: Chapter V), and “our best defence is a good offence” (NSS:6) 
83 In the June 2003 draft of the ESS the word pre-emptive was used. Later this was removed, apparently because some of the 
member states in the EU had problems of “translating” the word (Bailes:2005) 
84 ”It is time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength” and “[…] build and maintain our defences beyond 
challenge” (NSS:29) 
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denouncing the legitimacy of the ICC85. In the phrase where pre-emptive is used 
(NSS:6), there is little doubt on the intentions of the US acting unilaterally (see 
footnote no. 82). Whereas the ESS more or less rejects unilateral action:  
“There are very few if any problems we can deal with on our own, international cooperation 
is a necessity” and “[…] we would look to develop strategic partnership […] with all those 
who share our goals and values and are prepared to act in their support” (ESS:13) and “The 
UNSC has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security” (ESS:9).86  
 
In committing itself to an international order “based on effective multilateralism” 
(ESS:8) the European strategy emphasises the importance of legitimacy and 
international law: 
 “We are committed to upholding and developing international law” and “the development of 
a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule based 
international order should be our objective”.  
 
The ESS on this point can be summarised by the words of Matlary (2003:94): “Make 
law, not war”. As the opposite example, the NSS is accused of deviating from three 
basic principles within internationals norms: 1) The treaty of Westphalia about 
national sovereignty, 2) The UN charter which forbids the use of force or the threat on 
use of force except in self-defence and after a mandate from the UNSC, 3) The 
Nurnberg convictions which saw pre-emptive or preventive war as a war crime 
(Prestowitz:2003). 
The separate views on NATO likewise serve to exemplify the divergence between the 
two strategies. Where the NSS only mentions NATO in its last paragraph, the ESS 
hails NATO security contribution in the beginning of the document, if this could be 
interpreted as having any influence on how the different strategies measures the 
importance of the alliance. Furthermore, the NSS see NATO as a “tool in the toolbox” 
which can be used “whenever our interests” are threatened. The legitimacy of NATO 
military action is, in the view of the NSS, provided by NATO’s own mandate 
(NSS:25). The view of the EU developing military capabilities of its own is only 
                                                 
85 “We will take the actions necessary to ensure that our efforts to meet our global security commitments and protect 
Americans are not impaired by the potential for investigations, inquiry, or prosecution by the ICC, whose jurisdiction does 
not extend to Americans and which we do not accept” (NSS:16).  
86 The citation above was not in the first draft presented in EC summit in June 2003. According to Berenskoetter (2004:18) 
this change happened after German pressure: “Only the UN are able to procure international legitimacy- and thus global 
political and legal credibility […] It will stay that way”, words of the Assistant Foreign Minister of Germany in a conference 
about European Security in the autumn 2003) 
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welcomed if this development works with NATO (NSS:26). The ESS perception of 
NATO is that it is an essential element of the transatlantic relationship; however, the 
alliance is not given much space in the strategy87. 
Similarities between the NSS and the ESS are legion, although the rationale for 
researchers after the transatlantic crisis has been to focus on the differences. If we look 
beyond unilateral/multilateral action and pre-emptive/preventive, the strategies for 
example share the same policy towards North Korea (Biscop:2004:28). Although they 
have different means on how to deal with the so-called “new” threats, the strategies 
define the same threats seeing the problem of terrorists, WMD and rogue/failed states 
as the most important threats to our societies (ESS adds organised crime and regional 
conflicts). These similarities of the strategies and the fact that American reactions to 
the ESS were seen as a “sign of mature relationship” (Everts & Keohane:2004) could 
support the interpretation that the ESS was not seen as an attempt to balance the US, at 
least not by US officials. If the objective behind the ESS had been to balance the US, 
one would have expected that American reaction and response to the ESS was 
negative88. However, American observers were not negative, they were generally 
impressed (Oudenaren:2004:46). The ESS seemed to establish a basis for improved 
cooperation across the Atlantic, due to what the strategy included as well as what it left 
out (Ibid:48) 89. In many terms these findings could lead us to believe that the ESS 
never was an attempt to balance the US, but more an attempt to unite and reconcile the 
member states of the EU. The brilliant diplomatic craftsmanship90 of the ESS could be 
a reason why researchers find so many differences between the NSS and the ESS, yet 
the Americans were positive to the ESS. Another reason could be the fact that the 
policy prescriptions in the ESS are of a purely generic nature providing illustrated 
                                                 
87 Even though the alliance was not given much space in the ESS, the signals from the EU on NATO have been quite clear : 
”Our working relations with NATO are on a firm, clear, and agreed basis which respects the autonomy of each organisation” 
(Solana:2003c) and : “Commitments [about the collective defence clause in the Constitution] and cooperation in this area 
shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are 
members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation” (Art 41, 
subparagraph 7, Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe: 2004) 
88 “An important virtue of the Solana paper is that it avoids a tedious repetition of Europe’s multilateralist claims and the 
corresponding check-list  of EU defined tests that the US has to ‘pass’ in order to re-qualify as a true multilateralist in 
Europe’s eyes” (Oudenaren:2004:45) 
89 Already in April 2003, the title of Javier Solana’s speech in Harvard was : ”Mars and Venus reconciled, a new era for 
transatlantic relations” as a response to the more dark prophecies of Robert Kagan’s book “Paradise and Power” (2003). 
90 The Americans were very pleased that it was Javier Solana (former Secretary General to NATO) and his team (among 
them Solana’s no 2, the British diplomat Robert Cooper) that drafted the ESS, and not the Commission (Oudenaren:2004:47). 
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examples rather than specific instructions for the use and development of the EU 
instrument. On the other hand, the NSS contains instructions and guidelines all the 
way to the strategic and tactical level (Bailes:2005:14). Nevertheless, the main reason 
why the ESS seemed to have been such a success both in Europe and the US was in 
fact that it seemed to manage to satisfy all involved parties. For the antagonist states 
France and Germany, the ESS emphasised a “European way” and was a European 
answer to the NSS. For the status quo states like Britain, the strategy emphasised that 
Europe now could talk the language of hard power, in this age of terrorism, which the 
US had wanted Europe to do for such a long time. At the same time the document was 
seen by the British far more as a broad statement of intent, than a set of binding 
commitments (Hill:2004:7). 
 
4.4 Is the change in ESDP a result of power balance? 
There are several arguments in this analysis that give strong evidence that the change 
in ESDP is a result of power balance. However, we must revise our theories to both 
include balance of power theory in a combination with balance of threat theory. To 
eliminate the Waltzian belief of great power rivalry within Europe we have explained 
the EU as a subsystem. In this context it is possible to analyse the effects behind the 
change in ESDP in a neo-realist perspective. 
The first argument for viewing the change in ESDP as a result of power balance is the 
changed US foreign policy after 9/11. The analysis has showed that the new policy 
from the Bush administration could in many ways be seen as aggressive intentions. In 
the book “The future on balance of power” from 2002, Ikenberry et al. tried to answer 
the question why counter balance against the US had not yet occurred in the wake of 
the Cold War. Their conclusion was that the absence of balance of power efforts lies in 
the fact that the US hegemony has novel features. The first of which is that unique 
features of American power, such as geography, technology, ideology and democracy 
do not make the US a threat to European countries. The second argument is that US 
security commitments helped Europe overcome regional dilemmas as happened on the 
Balkans. The third argument is that the traditional power balancing may not be 
responsive to the threat American power pose (Ikenberry et al:2002). All these 
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arguments are in line with the view of balance of threat theory; it was first when 
Europe perceived the new American foreign and security policy as a threat or as 
having aggressive intentions the Europeans reacted. 
The notion from neo-realism that states respond to the particular features of their 
international structural environment is eminent to explain the changes in ESDP. An 
important aspect to explain changes in the international system after going from 
bipolarity to unipolarity is to characterize the new structure. The question is not 
whether new powers will rise and balance, but when (Mastanduno:1997:53-54). The 
new structure was unipolar, yet Europe did not feel threatened. The balance of power 
situation in the years after the Cold War rested on the US not being aggressive and 
using multilateral means of cooperation. Being an ally for the European countries for 
half a century, the countries of Europe never felt threatened by an invasion by the US. 
The threats the US posed during the years after the Cold War was the threat of 
competition, which Europe and the US had coped with since the end of the Second 
World War. However, immediately when US started to be more unilateral, more 
aggressive and did not include European allies or the UN in their decisions to go to 
war in Iraq, this was felt by the European countries as both a threat to their security 
and a threat to the European way of wanting to organise the international community 
in a multilateral manner. In neo-realist theory, the European countries relative 
weakness91 is a reason for their multilateral approach to the international system; 
hence also the reason for wanting the US to do the same so as their influence on US 
foreign and security policy may increase. When the US decided to change their foreign 
policy after 9/11, as we have seen in this analysis, the initial European reaction was 
quite reserved. It was the explicit emphasis on pre-emptive warfare and unilateral 
military action that some of the European states could not accept. The EU integration 
project, which had occupied the attention of the nation states in Europe since the end 
of the Cold War, had focused on the ultimate importance of rule of law, legitimacy and 
                                                 
91 As Robert Kagan writes (2003:37) : ”Because they are relative weak, Europeans have a deep interest in devaluing and 
eventually eradicating the brutal laws of an anarchic Hobbesian world where power is the ultimate determinant of national 
security and success”  and (ibid:2003:38) : “In an anarchic world, small powers will always fear that they will be victims. 
Great powers on the other hand, often fear rules that may constrain them more than they do anarchy” and (ibid) “Since the 
Europeans lack the capacity to undertake unilateral military actions, either individually or collectively, it is natural that they 
should oppose allowing others what they cannot do themselves. For Europeans, the appeal to multilateralism and 
international law has a real practical payoff and little cost”. 
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multilateralism. With the West Point speech and especially the NSS, American power 
lost its novel features. It became a threat to the European states’ ability to maximize 
their own interests through international institutions in a multilateral system.                  
A second argument for the change in ESDP as a result of balance of power is a 
timeline of incidents. As shown in the analysis, there is a close correlation in time 
between what may be conceptualised as US “aggressive intentions” and enhancement 
of military capabilities in the ESDP. This timeline of incidents is a pointer which 
clearly indicates that the ESDP decisions in Europe are not random coincidences, but a 
direct result of a European response to the new US foreign and security policy. 
 
Critics of neo-realist theory (Lebow& Risse:1996) claims that the theory has failed to 
explain the international system because no other great power has tried to balance the 
US. If one uses the time perspective of the Cold War where the USSR balanced US 
only after 3-4 years in 1948/49, this may be true. One of the shortcomings of this type 
of critique is that it uses historical precedence as an explanation and gives assumptions 
about the future using facts from the past. What if balancing is already taking place92, 
but this time the balancing efforts takes time since there is not just one single entity or 
unitary state that is doing the balancing? What if balance of power this time takes 
another form because the major countries which can do the balancing (except China) 
are all democratic states? During previous historical attempts to explain balance of 
power theory, there was no “democratic peace” or no supranational organisation of 
sovereign nation states, like the EU subsystem today. One of the main reasons why 
Europe does not fear - or feel threatened by - the US is that their security is not under 
threat93. This is the basis for all realist assumptions. If states no longer fear for their 
security and survival in the system, how will they react to secure themselves and 
maximize their own interests? Is it logical to oppose and balance a unilateral 
superpower’s military might if this military might is not a threat to state survival or 
state prosperity? As the analysis has proven so far, the efforts to balance the US 
through ESDP is not that of trying to create traditional bipolarity, and the unipolar 
                                                 
92 According to Waltz (2002) balancing is already taken place. 
93 A logical consequence of Waltzian theory should for example be that the US fears Britain’s 500 atomic bombs much more 
than North Korea’s five. However, the US fears North Koreas five bombs as a much bigger threat then the British bombs 
(Knutsen 1999:357). 
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moment of the US is not that of traditional oppressing hegemony. In many terms this 
analysis has shown that Europe’s effort to balance the US has also been a “moral” or 
normative balance based on the perception of international politics. The 
comprehensive security approach and the broad definition of the concept of security in 
the EU are examples that the EU is not balancing the US by using military tools, but 
with using a different approach to the problems of the international system. However, 
this comprehensive approach also needs a hard power military capability. The security 
policy of the EU has become “post-national” (Sjursen:2004). 
The states in the system are not forced to play the balancing game. One of the major 
flaws of neo-realist theory is its prediction that unipolarity will not be accepted by 
other great powers in the system. Faced with the hegemon as an oppressor with 
aggressive intentions, states can either choose becoming antagonists or status quo 
states94. If the distribution of power in the system is guided by a single pole, neo-
realism predicts that other states in the system will produce a counterbalance. In this 
case, the distribution of power was concentrated around one pole, however, the 
superpower did not decide to use power or show force before after 9/11. The US 
believed that it could use the unipolar moment to increase its power, enforcing its will 
to an invasion of Iraq without the necessary legitimacy. In this sense it is the attempt to 
increase its power which makes the European states to play the balancing game. Even 
though Britain and other status quo states like Italy and Spain (at first) supported the 
American view on Iraq, they also supported the evolution of the ESDP and especially 
the ESS. Britain was even in the lead when the decision to form the battle groups 
concept was taken. For France the rationale had always been to promote the EU as an 
international actor as the ESDP became a policy area where France easier could 
maximize its own interests than when standing alone95. For Germany, France had 
replaced US as its most important strategic partner and the rationale became to seek a 
solution with France in strengthening the ESDP as a mean for collective action. In fact, 
                                                 
94 Or as Ikenberry wrote (2002:4) : “The main security concern for many countries in Europe is not how to distance from an 
all-to-powerful United States, but how to prevent the United States from drifting away” –“ the practical reality for many 
states around the world is that they need the US more than it needs them” (Ibid:2002:2). 
95 “Those who cannot act unilaterally themselves, naturally wants to have mechanisms for controlling those who can” 
(Kagan:2003:39) 
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standing alone against the hegemon could be very dangerous for any antagonist state; 
standing together in the EU could be dangerous for the hegemon.  
“The EU member states will only share their foreign policy sovereignty if the gains of the 
common action are seen to be so great that sacrificing their sovereignty is worth it” 
(Smith:2003:4).  
 
Thus, a “Europeanisation” of security policy becomes the result of the nation states in 
the EU seeing their relative weakness in comparison with the superpower and where 
an institutionalisation of European security policy becomes a way to redress this 
relative weakness. For Britain, the solution became to support both sides, contributing 
to a shift in the power of balance and at the same time convincing the hegemon that 
the evolution of ESDP was not a threat to the superpower, but a way for Europe to 
develop hard power capabilities which the Americans had wanted Europe to do for 
such a long time96. 
An important reason for the antagonist states attitudes towards the US was the support 
in the domestic opinion polls for an anti-US policy. The polls in Britain, Spain, Italy, 
France and Germany (Aftenposten:2003b) showed strong opposition against the US-
led war in Iraq. Despite this fact, Britain, Spain97 and Italy supported the US, while 
France and Germany did not. Neo-realists will use this latter fact to claim that the 
theory of the two-level game explain nothing as the governments of the EU faced 
almost the same public opinion, but acted totally differently. However, as the analysis 
has shown, the two-level game and especially the logic of elections is an important 
part in understanding the development of the ESDP, although neo-realists will claim 
that the generalisation aspect of the “two-level game” is insufficient. 
 
The complexity of ESDP makes it necessary to analyse the phenomenon on several 
different levels, thus the next chapter will focus on internal dynamics of integration as 
an explanation of the change in ESDP. 
 
                                                 
96 The record of recent interventions “suggests that the most problematic transatlantic defence issue is not the relative ability 
to keep the peace, but rather the relative ability to fight wars” (Everts & Keohane:2004:42) and : “[…] the enthusiasm in 
some capitals for the Europeanization of national armed forces too often appears to be directly related to a deep reluctance to 
use military force” (Ibid:2004:16) 
97 After the election in Spain in 2004 the change of government turned Spain into an antagonist, minimizing its support to the 
US and withdrawing its troops in Iraq (Aftenposten:2004). 
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5. ANALYSIS IN AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
“[…] the institutional dimension has always been and remains a key to any attempt at 
developing a EU security and defence policy” (Andreani:2000:83) 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to show the influence of path dependency and spill-over 
as a reason for the change in ESDP after 9/11. There is a need for an alternative 
analytical perspective in addition to and as a supplement to the neo-realist one98. 
Theories of European integration have rarely been used in the past to explain changes 
in high-politics such as security and defence. The reason for this was simple, the 
foreign and security policy of each member state in the EU was seen as a vital part of 
their national sovereignty, and hence the power of decision making was not in the 
hands of supranational institutions but rather in the hands of the nation states. With the 
introduction of the CFSP as the second pillar in Maastricht, the enhancement of CFSP 
in Amsterdam, and especially after St Malo and the Helsinki HG, this had changed. 
Since the St Malo summit in 1998 until today, more has happened within European 
security and defence than the fifty years before.  
Institutional theory, represented here with NF and HI, is not in clear opposition or an 
obvious competing alternative to the state-centric theories of European integration. 
The theory questions some of the basic assumptions and offers a framework which can 
be regarded as supplementary to the understanding of the ESDP development. 
Institutional theory does not oppose neo-realism specifically as NF and HI were 
constructed to explain European integration and not state behaviour in the international 
structure. The assumption is that member states are important actors, but they are 
constrained by past decisions and functional and political spill-over effects which 
emerge from the institutions. The autonomy of the institutions as well as previous 
decisions shape the agenda and reduce the scope of action as processes turn 
irreversible. 
In this chapter I will first show that there is some supporting evidence to the 
assumption that Amsterdam and Nice were influenced by past decisions. Second, I will 
analyse the process from St Malo to the Constitution to see if path dependency had any 
effects on the development of ESDP after 9/11. Third, the role of the Commission and 
                                                 
98 “When studying ESDP it is therefore important to have in mind that ESDP, despite it being intergovernmental and not 
supranational in nature, is part and parcel of the ever more dynamic EU integration process” (Knutsen:2002:1) 
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ESDP institutions will be analysed before I seek to find evidence for the spill-over 
effect. Finally, the ESDP after 9/11 will be analysed before a short conclusion 
summarizing the findings in the chapter. 
 
5.1 Maastricht and Amsterdam – making the foundation wall of ESDP 
The Maastricht treaty embodied an intergovernmental consensus about CFSP. 
Maastricht undoubtedly impinged on the development of CFSP, which in turn was the 
fundamental basis for creating ESDP. One argument which underlines this path-
dependent evolution is that the treaty of Amsterdam became a direct result of the 
previous decisions in the Treaty of the European Union (TEU). Within the TEU it was 
incorporated that a new negotiation round would be performed before the next treaty, 
hence the Amsterdam treaty was known as the revision conference or Maastricht II99. 
In the Maastricht treaty it was decided that during the next Intergovernmental 
Conference (IGC)100 art J4 and art J10 in the TEU should be part of the 
intergovernmental bargaining and negotiation process. Hence, the new provisions of 
the Amsterdam treaty became a result of previous decisions and the member states 
seemed to have lost a part of their influence on setting the agenda.  
The IGC before Amsterdam was formally started in Torino in March 1996. Several 
parts of the treaty which concerned CFSP needed to be clarified. The institutional 
settings and the previous decisions at Maastricht made government control less 
possible, especially on setting the agenda and the timing of the conference. However, 
it was the member states that decided that there should be a revision conference after 
Maastricht, and it was the member states that decided whether or not new provisions 
of the CFSP should be amended, hence the final decision was in the hands of the 
national governments. Nevertheless, the IGC was made under organisational factors 
that constrained and facilitated the new policy and decision making process101.  
                                                 
99 An empirical evidence for this argument is that the summoning of the IGC was included in the TEU. The parties were bind 
to meet within a short time to evaluate the treaty and to negotiate further the unresolved elements. The Maastricht treaty listed 
a number of issues that were meant to be on the agenda of the IGC in 1996: “On the occasion of any review of the security 
provisions under article J.4, the Conference which is convened to that effect shall also examine whether any other 
amendments need to be made to provisions relating to the common foreign and security policy” (Art J.10 of the TEU).  
100 “An IGC is a conference where the representatives from the member states consider amendments to treaties. The outcome 
of the conference has to be agreed upon unanimously and ratified by all member states” (Bainbridge & Teasdale:1995:282) 
101 “The decision making process needs to be understood in a distinct historical, institutional and environmental setting, 
unveiling how actors are embedded in a web of structuring elements” (Sverdrup:1998:4). 
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The Maastricht treaty laid down regulations that contributed to shaping the agenda and 
the conference was not a voluntary process. The legacy from former political decisions 
and statements structured the course of the decision-making process (Sverdrup:1998: 
7-9). 
The process of legalisation accompanying the construction of CFSP reinforced the 
path-dependent process, as the foundations were laid of a legal framework within 
which foreign policy cooperation would have to evolve. Cooperation was 
institutionalised because there were formal rules of behaviour (Smith:2001:94). As 
examples of this Smith (ibid:2001:96) shows that the legalisation process of the TEU 
made demands on what was required by the member states102.  
“The emergence of explicit behavioural standards- rules and laws- is perhaps the most 
important manifestation of the institutionalisation of cooperation” (Smith:2001:99) 
 
When something is “routinised” or a rule first has survived, other alternative solutions 
are limited because these solutions would have to be in accordance with former 
procedure. Most often the common positions become more than just a point of 
reference and for the EU the CFSP common positions took the form of a legal act of 
the Council and became binding for the member states: 
“[…] the very idea of common foreign and security policy reflects a higher order obligation 
than the notion of consulting or cooperating in foreign policy” (Smith:2001:96-97). 
 
The cooperation within CFSP which emerged after Maastricht was not a new path; it 
was a cooperation which was continued in the existing surroundings of former 
decisions. The introduction of the Petersberg tasks which became a part of the 
Amsterdam treaty was a legacy from the WEU. Art. 17 (former J.7) in the Amsterdam 
Treaty opened for WEU integration in the Union103 and the Amsterdam treaty 
provided the CFSP with a new institution, the Policy Planning And Early Warning 
Unit, the task of which was to meet the new challenges of the enhanced CFSP 
cooperation. 
                                                 
102 TEU art 11.2 : “shall support the Union’s external and security policy […] shall refrain from any action which […]”. 
TEU art 16 : “shall inform and consult one another […]”. TEU art 15: “shall ensure that their national positions […]”. TEU 
art 19 : “shall coordinate their action in international organisations […]  
103 “The Western European Union (WEU) is an integral part of the development of the Union providing the Union with 
access to an operational capability notably in the context of paragraph” (Art 17, subparagraph 2, Treaty of Amsterdam 
(1997). 
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The likelihood of the EU adopting the Petersberg tasks without the historical decision 
on the WEU summit in 1992 seems very small. At the same time, the institutional 
cooperation within the CFSP had opened for a need to have a front figure if the CFSP 
were to have any role on EU foreign and security policy. The CFSP cooperation 
became a foundation wall – making it easier to build the next project on the standing 
foundations than to make new ones. 
The two most important factors contradicting the path-dependent assumptions from 
Maastricht to Amsterdam are the rational and state-centric view on the one side and 
the importance of external crisis and shocks on the other (Bono:2002). At first, the 
state-centric view (which LI asserts) assumes that even though decisions from the past 
shape the future, the nation states are in general in control of the process. That is, if the 
stakes are too high for a member state, or it does not see the development as 
beneficiary, it can opt out (in the Amsterdam treaty: “constructive abstention”), which 
in fact gives all power to the nation states if the desire to reject a decision is strong 
enough. However, the deeper the integration and institutionalisation of process 
becomes within a policy area, the more difficult it will be to withdraw, or for that 
matter, to be the one single country which will not agree to consensus when all others 
have.  
At the time of the Amsterdam IGC, Europe had just witnessed the collapse of Somalia, 
the genocide in Rwanda and the civil war in Yugoslavia with a failed EU common 
policy on display, especially in former Yugoslavia. If the timing of the IGC in 
Amsterdam had been different, the outcome would most probably have been 
otherwise; undoubtedly, both external and internal events shaped the conditions for the 
design of the new treaty (Sverdrup: 1998:19). The war in Yugoslavia became a perfect 
example where the EU could not speak with one voice; hence, the decision to 
construct a HR for CFSP might have been a product of lessons learned by the member 
states as well as internal institutional pressure. 
Another factor which altered the agenda was the British election in 1997. When 
Labour won the election, the interest in the concept of cooperation and flexibility 
decreased in the EU as the change in British government removed the “problem” of 
the British Conservatives (Sverdrup:1998:20). This argument is particularly in line 
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with the notion of the two-level game where the new government changes a state’s 
preferences as the election has given the government the necessary domestic support 
(or what Putnam calls “win-set”, Putnam:1988) to alter the policy towards the EU. The 
argument is a parallel to what Pierson calls the restricted time horizons of the political 
decision makers. However, it is well-known that for British policy the Conservative 
scepticism towards the EU is more in line with the British opinion polls 
(Eurobarometer 1995-2005). Nevertheless, very often the domestic pressure from the 
voters is less important within foreign and security policy, which in the case of Britain, 
gave the government the necessary room for policy change vis-à-vis EU. 
 
5.1.1 From St Malo to the Constitutional treaty 
“At its simplest level it can be argued that ESDP is both a political and legal concept. It 
encapsulates a number of decisions taken by EU member states, both on a bilateral and 
multilateral basis, beginning from the autumn of 1998 at St Malo” (Bono:2002:5) 
 
It is argued by many scholars that the Franco-British summit on St Malo was a direct 
result of the crisis emerging in Kosovo and of Europe wanting to avoid another Bosnia 
where the EU as an international security policy actor was a total failure. In this sense 
it seems that HI is not particularly valuable to explain the process of St Malo. 
However, although it was the external crisis that made the British and the French to 
take this lead in the EU, the process was still a result of previous historical decisions 
and institutionalisation. Without the institutionalisation and the legalisation of the 
CFSP first at Maastricht and later at Amsterdam it seems likely that the Kosovo crisis 
could have led to another reaction from the great powers in Europe (NATO, uni- or 
bilateral solutions) than the continuation and strengthening of the role of the CFSP.  
Once again, an important process in the Union was a result of external factors. The end 
of the Cold War had produced the Maastricht treaty and the crisis in Kosovo made the 
ESDP. However, it was not that simple. Why should the two major military powers of 
Europe join forces in the EU and hence give away some of the control of the evolution 
of military capabilities into the hands of the Union? From this point of view, the 
Franco-British decision was not rational. However, after the Amsterdam treaty (which 
was signed in October 1997) and the enhancement of CFSP with the Petersberg tasks 
 62
and the suggestion of an integration of the WEU into the EU, it became logical to 
continue to build on this already evolving institution instead of creating competing 
ones, or bilateral ones104. The St Malo summit did not invent a new way of organising 
an important part of the CFSP. The governments of France and Britain followed the 
path that was laid before them. This path started already in 1992 where the Petersberg 
accords were adopted by the WEU. There was no radical change in St Malo. Although 
it was a turning point with the emphasis on EU developing military capabilities (which 
was not a new idea, but earlier it lacked the necessary initiatives) it followed the same 
path which the WEU, Maastricht and Amsterdam had laid down.  
One thing which the Amsterdam treaty gave the EU was a HR for CFSP105. This could 
have been a strong incentive for why France and Britain wanted to build military 
capabilities within the EU rather than the NATO context, filling the capability gap and 
turning the EU into a security policy actor. Another important argument is of course 
the fact that Britain did not want to be left behind if a European defence capability 
initiative was taken. Instead, the Britons took the lead106. 
The case of St Malo shows that the path dependent development does not make 
decision makers slaves of the past, although the evolutionary development stems from 
a sequence of choices. Because of the path-dependent character of the development, 
small and well-timed interventions can be multiplied by other forces enabling reforms 
(March and Olsen:1995:44). Past decisions are both enabling and constraining factors. 
 
HI theorists might claim that there is a strong correlation between the treaty of 
Amsterdam and the treaty of Nice. The IGC in 2000 before the Nice treaty was 
supposed to deal with the so-called “Amsterdam leftovers” (Sverdrup:2001:7), just as 
Amsterdam had to deal with the unsolved problems in Maastricht. The 2000 IGC 
before the Nice treaty became influenced by some of the same self-committing 
mechanisms which the Amsterdam treaty had inherited from Maastricht. This time the 
                                                 
104 The intention of the St Malo was to take on crisis management operations in the framework of the Petersberg missions 
(Haine:2004:43) 
105 The proposal to have a HR for CFSP was initially originated as a French proposal. (Missiroli:2004:61). 
106 As a part of wider European policy the Blair government’s strategy considered that only through the Union could the 
European’s military means be enhanced – In fact, the British imperative for St Malo was that it was the only way to save the 
foundation of the transatlantic relationship- [US wanted Europe to participate more]Haine:2004:43). 
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Amsterdam treaty laid down procedures for the upcoming IGC107. Consequently, both 
the convening and the content of the IGC were to a large extent path dependent (Ibid). 
One of the main reasons why it became difficult for the member states to alter the 
agenda was the national adaptation, legalisation and institutionalisation of previous EU 
decision making in the member states. (Sverdrup:2001:19)108. However, these issues 
did not affect CFSP/ESDP in the same sense as the treaties as a whole - at least not 
before the Helsinki HG in 1999, as the CFSP provisions in Maastricht and Amsterdam 
did not create any serious obligations for a common defence and security policy which 
implied the use of military capabilities. Legalisation and national parliament’s 
ratification of the new course and the creation of ERRF made the HG into a decision 
which would have serious impacts on future security and defence policy.  
There are also arguments that the past decisions in the EU were less important. One 
example is that the Helsinki EC summit in 1999 redefined the WEU “acquis”, whereas 
it was decided implicit in the HG that the military forces should undertake combat-
type operations (Bono:2004:447).  
After the Helsinki HG the general tendency of new proposals was to push ESDP closer 
to a “real” defence (Working Group VIII:2002). In the Convention it was suggested to 
meet the new threats of terrorism with the forming of a so called “solidarity clause”109. 
Even though the past decisions and historical evolution made important impacts on the 
decisions about security and defence in the Convention, the solidarity clause was a 
direct result of the terrorist attack on 9/11. Without any terrorist attack on 9/11 it 
seems hardly likely that the Convention would have suggested such a proposal. In its 
Franco-German incarnation this idea was presented as a deliberate echo of EMU 
(Bailes:2003:27) as resistance from the neutrals and the Atlanticists in the EU made 
strong implications that a pioneer group would consist of countries from the heart of 
Europe (like the EMU which did not get the support of Sweden, Denmark and Britain). 
The draft clauses for the Constitution suggested that to compensate for this problem 
                                                 
107 “At least one year before the membership of the European Union exceeds twenty, a conference of representatives of the 
governments of the Member States shall be convened in order to carry out a comprehensive review of the provisions of the 
Treaties on the composition and functioning of the institutions” (Article 2, Protocol of the institutions with the prospect of 
enlargement of the European Union, Treaty of Amsterdam:1997). 
108 “The Europeanization of the domestic administrative institutions of the nation states made it increasingly difficult to 
maintain the idea of a clear separation between domestic position formation and international negotiation” (Ibid:2001:19). 
109 “The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist 
attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster […]” (Art I-43, Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe : 2004 ) 
 64
the full Council would take the decision (which would mean legitimacy) while the 
execution of the ESDP tasks could be delegated to a smaller group. In a sense both 
Schengen and the EMU became examples for solutions, thus being a product of a path 
dependent heritage from other policy areas which might also indicate a spill-over 
effect. These flexible arrangements were already amended in the Nice treaty110 and 
followed the precedence from Amsterdam (Art 23.1, TEU) where Denmark decided to 
opt-out of the new CFSP provisions111. The part of constructive abstention was 
proposed to be a part the new Constitutional treaty in the Convention:  
“The launching of an operation would be decided unanimously, but the rules on constructive 
abstention would apply […]. Member States not wishing to support an operation actively, in 
particular those not wishing to contribute militarily, would be encouraged not to oppose the 
operation, but to abstain” (Working Group VIII:18)112. 
 
A future ESDP operation would be run on behalf of and under the “strategic control” 
of the whole EU (Missiroli:2004:68). The evolution of the process made premises for 
the future design of ESDP cooperation as both the ESS in 2003 and the battle groups 
concept from 2004 followed in the same direction.  
A similar path dependent process can be found in analysing the text covering 
CFSP/ESDP provisions in the treaties from Maastricht to the Constitution. The 
Constitutional treaty subparagraph 2 in Art I-41 says: 
“The Common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common 
Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, 
acting unanimously, so decides”  
 
This important legislative part of the provisions of ESDP was a “direct descendent” 
from Maastricht through Amsterdam and Nice. Each time this article has been 
changed, the amendments have created more common provisions and deeper 
integration within security and defence. At first in Maastricht the phrase was :  
“which might in time lead to a common defence”,  and the Amsterdam Treaty added:  
                                                 
110 ”[…]The provisions of this article shall not prevent the development of closer cooperation between two or more member 
states on a bilateral level […]” ( Part of Art 17, Treaty of Nice) 
111 According to the protocol on the position of Denmark to the Amsterdam treaty: “Denmark does not participate in the 
elaboration and the implementation of decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications, but will not 
prevent the development of closer cooperation between the member state in this area”. According to Missiroli (2004:57) this 
is more a possibility to opt-in rather than opt-out. Denmark will automatically exempt from participating in the 
implementation of the policy, unless the country decides to do so. 
112 The attempt not to hinder the development of the ESDP from one or a few countries which did not want to participate is 
also found in the Constitutional treaty under art I 41, subparagraph 5 and 6.  
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“including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, in accordance with the 
second subparagraph, which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council 
so decide.” and “[…] with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the 
Union, should the European Council so decide” (Art. J.4.1 of TEU, and Art 17 of the Treaty 
of Amsterdam:1997). 
 
Article 17 in Title V was simplified in the treaty of Nice, but was a duplication of the 
Amsterdam treaty with the exact same words, only excluding the integration of the 
WEU which now had been formalised. However, at the same time the article was 
amended it was also creating new constraints for future decision making, among them 
amending first “should the European Council so decide” and secondly in the 
Constitutional treaty: “acting unanimously”.  
The analysis above shows that there is a path dependency between the treaties 
regarding CFSP/ESDP provisions. In fact, from one treaty to the next, the text is a 
continuation of the previous with amendments in the direction where previous 
decisions have made the path. This path has made the development irreversible and all 
new proposals and decisions have continued the evolution. The result over time is that 
the original decisions make unintended consequences beyond the original intent. Once 
an historical choice is made, it precludes and facilitates others. Political change 
follows a branching model (Krasner:1984:225).  
 
5.2 The role of institutions - the Commission as the political entrepreneur? 
According to Andreani (2000:83), the institutional dimension is the key to EU 
dynamics, embodying the driving forces of European integration. Originally, the 
member states created the institutions to overcome complex problems which they 
could not handle on their own, thus creating purposeful common institutions which 
became agents for their principal member states. However:  
“ the functions of supranational institutions may reflect not so much the preferences and 
intentions of their member state principals, but rather the preferences, and autonomous 
agency, of the supranational institutions themselves” (Pollack:1997:101) 
 
In many terms, the evolution of the institutions made the relative autonomy of EU 
institutions being determined mostly by the extent to which they could free themselves 
from the control of the EU’s member states (Peterson:2001:300). This was originally 
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the function of the Commission in the first pillar. However, within ESDP the role of 
the Commission was marginalized. The Commission has had a non-exclusive initiative 
right in the CFSP after Maastricht, the same right as any other member state. 
Nevertheless, as this part of the analysis will show, the Commission has suggested 
several proposals and many of them became quite influential. This is a reason why the 
role of the Commission is seen as a political entrepreneur. Already in 1995 the 
Commission proposed to abolish the principle of unanimity and hence to introduce a 
more effective decision making procedure with more Qualified Majority Voting 
(QMV) in the Council (European Commission:1995). What is more astonishing is that 
the Commission in 1996 during the IGC before Amsterdam proposed: 
“[…] introduction of explicit provisions to ensure that the Union can speak with one voice in 
international organizations and thus defend all the relevant interests more effectively”  
 
Other proposals were the construction of a Political Committee within the Council to 
prepare decisions, QMV to be the norm for taking decisions under CFSP, possibility of 
Union action by a limited number of Member States when the others do not oppose it 
though they need not participate, provided the Union's common interest is duly 
represented, adopting the Petersberg tasks into the Treaty of Amsterdam, incorporating 
the WEU in the EU, and finally, closer integration of the armaments industry which 
implied closer cooperation including the establishment of  an armaments agency 
(European Commision:1996). 
It seemed in fact that most of the changes from Amsterdam to Helsinki and even the 
eventual creation of the EDA in 2004 originated as proposals and initiatives from the 
Commission. However, this is not surprising. Within a rational choice perspective, 
making CFSP/ESDP more supranational will be in the Commission’s (and its actors) 
interest as it will gain more influence over the process. Even though the findings above 
show that the Commission very early became a political entrepreneur for the evolution 
within ESDP, the Commission did not seem to have suggested any enhancement of 
military capabilities as was the theme on St Malo. Rather, within the domain of high 
politics the Commission had a low profile, although it continued the phrase from 
Maastricht: “A real common foreign and security policy has to extend to common defence” 
(Ibid:1996). 
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But what was the role of the Commission before Cologne and Helsinki? These two 
important EC summits laid the foundations of the ESDP. Normally, the Commission 
had expressed its views even within the intergovernmental parts of the EU, as showed 
above. It was natural that the Commission, as it had done in the past about CFSP, 
would argue for a more supranational control of ESDP113. However, during decision-
making to enhance EU’s military capabilities in St Malo, Cologne and Helsinki, the 
Commission was more a follower than the organizing entrepreneur. The Helsinki EC 
called on the Commission in December 1999 to set up a Rapid Reaction Facility for 
the civilian crisis management to follow the HG. It was not the other way around114. 
The Commission did not have any role before the St Malo summit, the summits in 
Cologne or Helsinki. In fact, a review of all Commission press releases in 1999 before 
Cologne and Helsinki and in 2000 before the Nice treaty and the IGC can confirm that 
the Commission was not setting the agenda for security and defence. The Commission 
may have functioned as a political entrepreneur within several areas, but in the areas of 
security and defence, and especially the question of military capabilities, the initiative 
was first and foremost in the hands of the nation states.  
Although the Commission only played a minor role in the creation of ESDP it still had 
influence in other areas. In 1997 it was decided that the budget expenditures of CFSP 
would not decrease the following budget years as long as the Commission did not 
propose otherwise115 (EU Bulletin 1.4.1, 7/8 1997). In many ways the decision can be 
interpreted as an irreversible and path dependent decision. The proposal from the 
Commission was implemented in Art 28 of the Amsterdam treaty and today the ESDP 
expenditures are divided in the same manner; the Union budget have all 
“administrative expenditure”, while for the military operations “costs lie where they 
fall” (Missiroli:2004:68).  
                                                 
113 Before the Nice treaty: “The Commission is convinced that only an integrated approach to crisis management can 
guarantee the consistency and efficiency that enable the Union to fully play its role on the international scene”. (Prodi:2000) 
114 “I have also decided that, with the Member States, the EU should work up non-military headline goals, to match the 
military on the creation of the Rapid Reaction Force” (Patten:2000) 
115 “The agreement provides for CFSP operational expenditure to be charged to the Community budget except in cases where 
the expenditure relates to operations with military implications or in the defence field or where the Council unanimously 
decides otherwise” (EU bulletin 1.4.1, 7/8 1997) 
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 There are several other examples of the Commission being a political entrepreneur. 
The Euro-Mediterranean partnership116 (the Barcelona process), the “Wider 
neighbourhood” report from March 2003 (European Commision:2003a) and the “EU-
UN Joint Declaration on cooperation in crisis management” serve as examples on the 
Commissions ability to focus on “soft power” and setting the agenda. The latter report 
laid the foundations of the comprehensive and conflict preventive approach to the new 
security threats especially focusing on multilateralism and the cooperation with the 
UN in a period of strong transatlantic tensions (European Commission: 2003b), which 
in fact became the path the member states chose to take when signing the ESS. 
 
5.2.1 The role of ESDP institutions 
Within institutional theory it is argued that specialized and fragmented institutions 
may be “stickier” than integrated institutions (such as cabinet governments) and thus 
may promote path dependency in policy outcomes (Peterson:2001:302). The 
institutions of ESDP are typical specialized and fragmented institutions. Following this 
argument one would believe that the ESDP institutions sets the agenda and promotes a 
path dependent behaviour within ESDP. In connection with the HR for CFSP, 
additional bodies and institutions were established in order to cope with the increasing 
load of policy formulation and implementation that the ESDP imposed on the Council 
secretariat. First proposed in the Cologne summit in 1999, the interim of the PSC, 
EUMC and EUMS started their work in March 2000 (Missiroli:2004:63). The area of 
foreign, security and defence policy became one of the most institutionalised policy 
areas in the EU, already having institutions like the rotating presidency, the General 
Affairs Council (GAC), the Political committee, COREPER, the Council secretariat, 
and the Commissions Directorate General for external relations. The ESDP institutions 
that were formed were not supranational in nature, as their forms of functions were 
under the intergovernmental decision making structure of the second pillar. 
Nevertheless, their role was not to focus on maintaining the intergovernmental 
                                                 
116 The Barcelona process is an attempt to contribute to regional peace and stability in Europe’s surroundings by : 
1) Having a political and security dialogue with the countries in the region, 2) Constructing a free trade area, 3) 
Rapprochement between people through cultural, social and human partnership between civil societies (Wolff:2003) 
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structure, rather, their role and mandate became to emphasise and develop European117 
structures for defence enhancement and cooperation118. According to Howorth (2003) 
the work of the newly created institutions was essential and invaluable for the 
possibilities of making the ESDP operations in 2003; hence the creation of the 
institutions had a direct impact on the decision making at the intergovernmental EU 
level. For the PSC, meeting two-three times a week they gave the Council valuable 
opinions of policy formulation and overseeing the implementation of agreed policies. 
The HR for CFSP and his secretary became a strong an important institution in filling 
in the role of internal coordination and external representation. The EUMC 
institutionalised and made important routines for the cooperation of the Chiefs of the 
Defence Staff, and finally, the EUMS contributed with formalising the problems of 
command and control, rules of engagement and logistics and communication. Building 
on the “acquis” gained from the WEU planning for the Petersberg tasks 
(Bono:2004:447), the EUMS had also contributed with the development of “the 
broader politico-military policies” concepts and procedures, information policy and a 
handbook of crisis management procedures.   
The core of the debate is the question if the governments in Europe would have 
decided to engage the ESDP operations without the preparation of these institutions?  
The institutions created opportunities for the decision makers which both enabled and 
constrained further development in a certain direction. As history of European 
integration has showed, this direction has moved, although with setbacks, more or less 
in one direction. A contrast to this argument is that it is the member states that provide 
the capabilities to be mobilised. There are no legal obligations to mobilise these 
capabilities, hence it requires a peculiar combination of willingness and ability to put 
these capacities at the disposal for the EU. Once again it seems, institutions are 
important, but the member states make the final decisions. However, the pressure for 
                                                 
117 ”The committee [about PSC] has succeeded in avoiding the conflicts between national capitols and ”Brussels” which 
many had foreseen at the outset This it achieved by an interactive process of constantly reconciling national positions until a 
European position emerged” (Howorth:2003:20) 
118 Over time, the identity of the actors working in the different common institutions, although the institutions make proposal 
to an intergovernmental decision making structure like the Council, will be Europeanised. This “Brusselisation” is an 
important underlying variable for the development of identity amongst the actors in the institutions (Sjursen:1999, 
Rieker:2004). In the field of analysing identity and change of preferences amongst nation states, institutions and their actors, 
there have been done substantial work. However, the debate is often related to sociological institutionalism, “logic of 
appropriateness” and social constructivist theories.  
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each member state to follow the majority and an often pre-determined path is strong as 
the process of abstention is legalised in the treaty119 (Missiroli:2004:66-67). The 
cooperation in the Union was institutionalised in a sense that made precautions where 
the possibilities for different actions are reduced for the member states. These 
instruments makes it extremely unlikely that a member state would decide to block an 
ESDP decision (Ibid:2004:67). 
It is also worth mentioning that it was only the PSC which was treaty-based in the 
Nice treaty. This means that the EUMC and the EUMS are not treaty based, which is 
an example that the legalisation process did not cover all aspects of the ESDP. The 
reason for this exception was mainly due to the reluctance of the neutral member states 
to have these institutions as part of the treaties. ESDP has in many ways moved 
forward by intergovernmental decisions first, with a codification to follow only later 
on. The only exception is the creation of the HR, which preceded rather than followed 
the ESDP (Ibid:2004:65). In the long run, however, HI theorists will argue that almost 
all decisions were bound by and constrained by the decisions made in the past. 
 
5.3 The Spill-over effect 
Within institutional theory presented here, the differences between HI and NF are 
indeed very small. However, one distinction often made is that HI can explain 
continuity while NF can explain change (Peterson:2001:297). 
From NF theory it is possible to assume that ESDP is a result of the spill-over effect 
from economic integration. The increased level of cooperation in the economic sector, 
exemplified by the EMU project, influenced the emergence of ESDP. NF theorists will 
therefore give a primary role to an analysis of how economic and monetary decisions 
shaped the debate about military and security issues (Bono:2002:9). Empirical analysis 
has shown that the effect of spill-over has not been automatic. However, it is obvious 
that European integration has gone from less intergovernmental to more supranational. 
NF theory predicts that there will be a political spill-over when supranational officials 
initiate a preference for cooperation in other sectors. In 1999 the implementation of the 
                                                 
119 “Such abstention must be qualified in a formal declaration: it does not oblige the member state(s) in question to apply the 
decision and pay for it, but only to accept that ‘it commits’ the Union. Such a qualified abstention blocks the decision only if 
the member states who choose it amount to more than one-third of the weighted votes in the Council (Art.23.1, TEU) 
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Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) reached its third phase; currencies were 
deadlocked and the European Central Bank started to function as preparations for 
implementing the Euro in 2002 was starting (Egan:2003). The Single market and other 
economic areas were now well integrated within the first pillar of the Community and 
the European economic project was deemed, preliminary, as a success. If the theory of 
spill-over is correct, initiative for St Malo and the continued process of establishing 
ESDP under the summits in Cologne and Helsinki, would be a process of a political 
spill-over where the supranational actors of the Commission and the other institutions 
guided the further process of integration. However, the St Malo process did not seem 
to be the result of any influence by supranational institutions (as shown above with the 
role of the Commission) or a result of a spill-over effect from the positive experience 
from economic integration. Nevertheless, if the economic integration and the 
Community project had failed, is it likely that the historical arch-enemies of Europe 
would have decided to cooperate within the realm of high politics as well? 
Undoubtedly, the economic integration and cooperation between the member states 
could be seen as a reason for wanting cooperation within other sectors of the Union. 
The weakness of NF theory in trying to explain St Malo is that the meeting took place 
without The Commission or the EP playing any role, and as argued above, it was 
triggered first and foremost of the temporal context of the Kosovo crisis120.  
The concept of functional spill-over and vertical effects of cooperation seem to be 
parts of NF theory which is more eminent. This is also more in line with path 
dependency. An argument in this direction is that the St Malo summit was made 
possible because of the enhanced cooperation of the member states within the CFSP in 
addition to the creation of a HR which reinforced the institutional dimension. 
However, it was first after Labour won the election in 1997 that the British took an 
interest in the CFSP cooperation in the Union. In the period before 1997 the Britons 
had been the biggest brake for this cooperation.  
The spill-over effect has a stronger explanatory power in explaining what happened 
after St Malo, than explaining the process of security and defence integration as a 
                                                 
120 Still, it can be argued, within the context of NF, that the Franco-German “special relationship” was the basis for the 
negotiations in Maastricht and Amsterdam, where a link between EU’s external role and the WEU peacekeeping and defence 
tasks was extremely important for the further development of the ESDP. The “special relationship” between France and 
Germany seemed to be a product of the economic integration in the EU (Bono:2004:443). 
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whole. Once initiated, the St Malo initiative lead to a spill-over effect in adjoining 
sectors, thereby propelling the integration of security and defence onwards. The 
proposal to create new institutions for ESDP in Cologne and of course the construction 
of the Helsinki HG can be seen as direct links from the St Malo initiative121. The 
process of functional spill-over continues and the institutions “help” the member states 
to overcome complex issues more effectively, thus creating possibilities for making 
crisis management operations as it happened in 2003, and again the means and 
possibilities for actions and decisions are directed by the institutions. The evaluation of 
the ESDP operations in 2003 led to the decision to create an agency which could 
enhance the Union’s effort to coordinate the construction of the common military 
capabilities, hence the EDA was formed. The success of the operations in 2003, the 
cooperation between the member states and the function of the institutions made it 
possible to create the ESS, the battle groups and suggest that the EU should take over 
the NATO SFOR in BiH. Integration begets further integration (Peterson:2001:297). 
In this sense, the functional spill-over effect can explain one reason for the ESDP 
development from St Malo until today. Pierson (1998) argued that the spill-over effect 
was only likely to occur under rather specific circumstances, namely where policy 
consequences and future circumstances are uncertain, state preferences are unstable or 
time horizons are short. For the development of ESDP it is possible to argue that all 
these factors were present. 
If economic integration did not produce political spill-over, NF theory seems to have 
several flaws. However, it is possible to find a political spill-over from another 
political process; the enlargement process: 
 “With a view to the forthcoming enlargement of the Union, most members of the Group 
consider it is more important than ever that the Member States should agree to move from 
unanimity to other decision making procedures […]” (Working Group VIII:18).  
 
The decision of enlargement made by the EC in Copenhagen in 2002 lead to the 
necessary evaluation of decision making procedures and of course, to a political spill-
                                                 
121 It also produced other forms of functional spill-over effects: “Following the Cologne Conclusions and in the light of the 
Presidency's report, the Conference will examine the size and composition of the Commission, the weighting of votes in the 
Council and the possible extension of qualified majority voting in the Council, as well as other necessary amendments to the 
Treaties arising as regards the European institutions in connection with the above issues and in implementing the Treaty of 
Amsterdam” (Helsinki Presidency conclusions part I, no 16, European Council:2003b) 
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over effect where the enlargement process (which was first initiated early in the 1990s) 
seemed to make unintended consequences beyond the original intent. Enlarging the 
EU from 15 to 25 states made it necessary to make several changes that can be seen as 
a result of a political spill-over effect from the enlargement process. As mentioned in 
chapter four, one of the reasons for the creation of the ESS in 2003 was the 
enlargement process. It was a strong rationale for the EU-15 and especially the great 
powers in the Union, to have a security doctrine in place before the enlargement in 
May 2004. The enlargement process gave incentives to strengthen the supranational 
institutions (especially the role of the EP) in order to meet the demand and accusations 
of lack of democratic procedures (“the democratic deficit”)122. According to Peterson 
(2001:297), NF usually helps explain how the structural context of the EU decision 
making changes, such as via the shift to increased QMV and the empowerment of the 
EP. In the case of enlargement, NF’s predictions of a political spill-over effect may 
have been correct. With the enlargement, the integration process had to move forward; 
hence there were also institutional building implications for security and defence 
issues. However, even though there was a political spill-over effect from the 
enlargement process, this did not affect the ESDP in any large scale and a common 
defence is still not established. The changes proposed in the Constitution of more 
supranational elements issues were still seen as insignificant in the eyes of state centric 
theorists and do not change the strong intergovernmental character of ESDP123. 
 
5.4 ESDP after 9/11- Internal dynamics as reasons for change? 
Following the ESS and the success of the ESDP operations in 2003, a lot of changes 
happened within ESDP. A number of so called “breakthroughs” in the building of the 
EU’s policy corpus and structures regarding ESDP happened as an effect of the ESS : 
The firming of proposal for the EU to take over the NATO SFOR operation in BiH, 
                                                 
122 Changes proposed in the Constitution was that co-decision (between Council and EP) should be used more frequently 
giving the EP decision making influence in 95 % of EU decision making. However, the influence of the EP in security and 
defence matters was still marginalised as the Council only needed to consult with the EP on CFSP matters (Art I 40, Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe) 
123 The role of the EP in ESDP is to approve the Community budget for the common institutions and to be consulted when 
decisions have been made (Missiroli:2004)  
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the decision to set up an agency in the field of armament and defence capabilities124 
and the reaching of agreement (after considerable Franco-British negotiation after the 
“Tervuren” suggestion) on the establishment of a small EU military planning cell in 
NATO (Bono:2003:446)125, and finally a provisional agreement among member states 
to strengthening leadership in EU external policies - an EU foreign minister (Bailes: 
2005: 19). The effects of the 2003 ESDP operations and the construction of the ESS 
became a confidence building value contributing to the relative non-controversial 
creation of the battle groups in February 2004. However, Bailes (2005:20) argues that 
no direct cause and effect link can be claimed from the adoption of ESS to any of these 
other moves. They are perhaps best seen as parallel reflections. In this view the 
assumption of the path dependent or functional spill-over effect from the ESS is not 
present. However, there are several arguments for the opposite. In fact, the trilateral 
battle groups concept was constructed based on the strategy agreements from the ESS, 
the continuation of a so-called “coalition of the willing” which can be traced as far 
back as Amsterdam. The formulation of the ESS and the process of the Constitution 
are one of the variables in the long list of historic decisions which may explain the 
creation of the EDA126. Finally, it can be argued that the EU take over of the SFOR in 
BiH could not have been achieved without the ESS. In the EC summit in December 
2003 where the ESS was endorsed, the EC decided four topics to follow up: Effective 
multilateralism with the UN at its core, terrorism, Middle East and BiH. The follow up 
decision made at the summit functioned as a constraint for future developments and 
decision making, and it introduced BiH as an area of commitment for the ESDP 
(European Council 2003b). 
The EC summit in June 2004 also endorsed a text forwarded from the Council 
concerning “comprehensive policy” for BiH, which was explicitly identified as the 
                                                 
124 Council decision of 17 Nov 2003 created a team to prepare for the establishment of an agency in the field of defence 
capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (Official journal of the EU L318/19,  3 December 2003). 
125 It is now known as the civil military planning cell and is linked with a (non-standing) EU operations centre – in parallel 
with an EU planning implant in the NATO structure (Bailes:2005:19) 
126The EDA is seen by many as a result of the new security and defence integration in the ESDP and some might argue the 
importance of its predecessor, the OCCAR (Organisation Conjoint de Cooperation en matiere d'Armement) which was 
established in Nov 1996 by the Defence Ministers of France, Germany, Italy and Britain (it was also a Commission proposal 
for the IGC in 1996). Its aim was to provide more effective and efficient arrangements for the management of certain existing 
and future collaborative armament programmes :“The Agency [about future EDA] would incorporate, with a European label, 
closer forms of cooperation which already exist in the armaments field between certain Member States (OCCAR)” (Working 
Group VIII:22).   
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response to the ESS related mandate of December 2003. The text underlined the 
political aim of putting BiH “irreversibly on track towards EU membership” and 
otherwise consisted of a set of general and specific measures to improve the coherence 
of the EU’s various activities and instruments in BiH with special reference to the 
impending EU takeover of SFOR (Bailes:2005:22).  
Recently, three more examples within ESDP development can be used arguing for a 
path dependent and functional spill-over effect, especially from the 2003 development. 
First, the EC summit in June 2004 decided on the HG 2010 which seemed to be a 
direct response to the follow-up decisions made at the Brussel EC summit in 2003 
(Quille:2004). Second, the normative focus on legitimacy in the ESS created a new 
environment that had to be explored. In a report delivered to the HR of CFSP in 
September 2004, a study group concluded that the EU needs to build on a doctrine 
based on human security127 (Kaldor et al:2004). It seemed that the EU with this report 
was questioning the norms and the legitimacy of the last 60 years in the international 
system. The fall of the traditional security concept after the Cold War, the 
interventions in Kosovo and Iraq without a UN mandate, and the focus on the EU as a 
global actor with its new security doctrine made it necessary for a debate on these 
issues, thus a functional spill-over effect from the ESS can in some sense be 
recognised. Third, the decision to create a European security and Defence College and 
finally the construction of the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) are examples of 
other path dependent and spill-over products of the evolution. (BBC:17/09:2004)128. 
 
5.4 Is the change in ESDP a result of spill-over and path-dependency? 
In this chapter I have been preoccupied why there is a change in ESDP and if 
institutional theory has any explanatory power. I have showed that there are several 
factors supporting the hypothesis that the change in ESDP after 9/11 is a product of 
spill-over and path dependency. The first argument in this line is the evidence of a path 
                                                 
127 "Human security" refers to the protection of individuals, as opposed to "state security," which refers to the defence of 
borders. 
128 The EGF cooperation can be traced back to the “Eurofor” which was created in 1995 by France, Italy, Portugal and Spain 
to meet the adoption of the Petersberg tasks in the WEU, and also the “Eurocorps” (France, Germany, Belgium and 
Luxembourg). In 1999 The Cologne summit agreed to redefine the Eurocorps into a European crisis reaction corps directly 
connected to the CFSP (Sjursen:1999:9). The EUMS inherited  procedures and policies from both “Eurofor” and “Eurocorps” 
(Bono:2004) 
 76
dependent process. HI theory recognizes that the member states are important actors 
and ultimately make the decisions. What is not so obvious is whether the process of 
developing ESDP is voluntary or if the member states are constrained by former 
decisions and the historical development. Furthermore, how is it possible for the 
member states to shape the agenda or alter the agenda? The more institutionalised the 
cooperation within ESDP gets, the more costly it will be for any member state to try to 
opt-out or wanting not to be a part of the evolution. The member states are not as 
solemnly powerful as state centric theorists will claim, although finally, they make the 
decisions, but with highly questionable degree of voluntariness and a lack of options to 
choose from129. Once an EU policy is set, it is often even harder to change it, even 
when it has outlived its usefulness (Peterson:2001:302). From the treaty of Maastricht 
all the way to the Constitution and ESS, previous decisions make unintended 
consequences and constrain the dynamics of the evolution of the ESDP. Decisions are 
made on the basis of norms and rules accumulated from past experience and learning, 
rather than on calculations of preferences and the anticipation of future events 
(Sverdrup:2001:4-5). Rules and procedures are institutionalised in a cultural setting 
which creates a legacy making it almost impossible to change or redirect policy which 
is not in accordance with the past.  
 
The second argument supporting the hypothesis is the role of institutions and 
supranational actors. The Commission can be regarded as a political entrepreneur as it 
becomes a powerful actor setting the agenda and leading the process of further 
integration. However, there are also limitations on the influence of the Commission. 
The analysis has showed that the Commission’s role is almost non-existent before the 
St Malo summit and the important Cologne and Helsinki EC meetings when it comes 
to shaping the agenda of security and defence policy. Nevertheless, several changes in 
the development of the ESDP derives originally from Commission proposals.  
Considering the role of the ESDP institutions, they have become agents for their 
principal member states eventually evolving incrementally within the existing norms 
                                                 
129“Member state preferences are still affected in turn by the EU policy making process. Once the member states have agreed 
that the EU should pursue particular objectives , they become involved in a process in which their initial preferences are 
reshaped, and in which they must make compromises over how these objectives will be achieved” (Smith:2003:197) 
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and procedures in a path dependent way. The “Europeanisation” process within the 
institutions reinforces their autonomy and the institutions become independent actors 
in the game. The role and function of these institutions had a serious impact on the 
operational capability and the will to use crisis management and military operations in 
2003. 
The evidence of a spill-over effect is the third argument supporting the institutional 
approach. Although the political spill-over from the economic sector to the policy area 
of security and defence is not so eminent, the political spill-over from the enlargement 
process is. Apart from the creation of the ESS, which can be seen as a spill-over from 
the enlargement process, there are few other implications from this process that 
affected the “high-politics” of ESDP. The functional spill-over effect can explain how 
the St Malo initiative lead to the ESDP changes after 9/11. Yet, the most eminent 
weakness of NF assumptions is the attempts to generalise about the integration 
process, thus it has problems to explain why a more marked level of integration in the 
military and security field did not develop under SEA or under Maastricht and 
Amsterdam treaties and why it is the end of the 1990s that the integration has taken 
place (Bono:2002:10). Another factor is the focus on the automaticity of the process. 
European integration did not expand steadily, but it stops and starts 
(Moravcsik:2005:6)130. Beyond the attempts to generalise and the focus on the 
automaticity of the process, NF theory has several aspects which are valuable in 
analysing the reason for change in ESDP after 9/11. 
 
Focusing on institutions, path dependency and the spill-over effect, a major weakness 
of institutional theory is its lack of explaining external factors as an important variable. 
However, it is possible to claim that external factors is an underlying variable for shift 
in government preferences, thus HI can partially explain this impact. During the 
creation of ESDP in 1998/1999 the Kosovo crisis seemed to be the direct cause of the 
EU policy change.  Even though it is empirically impossible to investigate, it can be 
argued that without the Yugoslavian civil war, NATO renewal and the Kosovo crisis, 
the ESDP would not have been constructed. It seems that dramatic external shocks 
                                                 
130  “Whenever integration stagnated, scholars criticised NF, whenever integration progresses, they rediscovered it” 
(Moravcsik:2005:9) 
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created a situation where the existing rules and procedures were unhelpful for 
interpreting the world and create meaning (Sverdrup:2001:5). Still, the possibilities for 
decision and actions, at least within the EU, are constrained and enabled by the 
institutional evolution and past decisions, hence, the decision to create the ESDP 
within the institutional context of the EU did not evolve from the blue. Another aspect 
is that once the external factor have created new decision making within the frames of 
previous decisions, the further process and evolution can be explained by institutional 
theory. 9/11 made the EU focus on terrorism and when initiated, this policy became 
path dependent for the ESDP, like any other external shock or crisis. Institutional 
theory obviously has no place for seeing the change in ESDP as a result of the 
reoriented US foreign and security policy. Beyond explaining shift in government 
preferences as a result of the logic of elections, institutional theory focuses on the 
internal variables of the integration process. 
 
The restricted time horizons of political decision makers due to the logic of elections 
are factors which create deviation between the nation states planned and actual control 
over the integration process. The Labour victory in the British election in 1997 seemed 
to be one of the main reasons behind the will and effort to focus on the EU as a 
security policy actor at St Malo. The problem with HI is that it has difficulties in 
explaining dramatic shifts which are not products of any path dependency. Although 
the theory takes into account the importance of short term political effect as a rationale 
for intergovernmental decision making in the EU, the theory fails to explain decision 
making which is not in a path dependent context. The British election became another 
external factor where the shift in government preferences changed the development in 
the CFSP in a new direction. It was not a product of the past decisions. However, as I 
have argued earlier in this chapter, the mechanism that made the French and the 
British focus on the EU and its already established CFSP institutions as the “tool” for 






What explains the change of ESDP after 9/11 2001? On the basis of the preceding 
analysis the answer is less clear-cut than what might have been desired. Significantly, 
the theoretical approaches applied in this thesis offer partly complementary, partly 
competing explanations to our question. From one side one would argue that changes 
in ESDP were driven by the general of US foreign and security policy since 9/11. 
From the opposite theoretical vantage point, one would conclude that ESDP 
development was primarily a continuation of the European integration process, where 
path dependency, spill-over and the autonomous role of institutions are central 
explanatory factors. If we attempt to systematise the empirics, it appears that the ESDP 
has been part of three partly parallel processes of change. The first process refers to the 
incremental, stepwise development of ESDP from Maastricht until the present. The 
second process is externally directed and more recent; it points to the new security 
challenge in Europe, as displayed by the Kosovo crisis and lessons learned from the 
Yugoslavian civil war. This process heralds the St Malo summit and the decision to 
create military capabilities for the Union as the key moment of change. There is also a 
third process, however, in which ESDP development appears as European response to 
American unilateralism since 9/11. Here, integration is accelerated by a defined 
external impetus, inclining the EU towards an autonomous security strategy and “on 
the ground” military operations. To what extent can neo-realist theory bring light over 
these three processes, which together amount to the development of the ESDP?  
 
First, if balance of power/balance of threat theory was to fit with ESDP development, 
we would, first, need to find evidence of a marked change in US foreign and security 
policy after 9/11. Our analysis has shown that there was indeed such a change; 
although some arguments point to the presence of unilateral US policy during the 
Clinton administration, it is clear that the focus on pre-emptive warfare and a more 
authoritative use of force after 9/11 indicates a turn towards more “aggressive 
intentions”.  The second point according to balance of power/balance of threat would 
be the perception among European countries that the new US foreign and security 
policy constituted a threat to European interest maximisation. As we have seen, 9/11 
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had primarily a long-term impact, as the initial reactions were those of strong 
European support for their American allies. In the fall of 2002 this had changed 
dramatically. The perception of American foreign and security policy as having novel, 
progressive features dissipated in Europe when pre-emptive warfare and American 
will to act alone entered centre stage. The US policy change became a threat to the 
European preference for multilateral institutions, consciously supported by the EU as 
well as national governments. 
If European reactions led to a marked enhancement of ESDP at the expense of NATO 
and the nation states, neo-realist assumptions would hold much explanatory power. 
The development of ESDP military capabilities during 2002 and 2003 indicates a 
timing in which EU member states were using the ESDP as an attempt to balance the 
US. However, the enhancement of ESDP has not been at the expense of NATO131. The 
evidence has shown that a more correct assumption is to see the ESDP evolving not as 
a substitute to NATO, but as a parallel. The enhancement of the ESDP was the sum of 
member states preferences; most significantly, the principal member states wanted to 
solve the issues of the new security agenda which was too large to handle for the 
nation states acting alone. The security and defence policy of the EU has become post-
national as the focus on protecting the territorial integrity has been reduced to the 
benefit of a broader security concept and the meeting of transnational threats such as 
terrorism. 
The theory of balance of power/balance of threat would predict, furthermore, the 
development of a European security strategy which would emphasise balancing efforts 
towards the US. The decision to create the ESS was taken on an informal EU summit 
which started the day after the Iraq war was declared over. Although the ESS in many 
ways can be seen as an attempt to strengthen the military component at the EU level, it 
was also an attempt to reconcile the EU member states after the Iraq crisis. The 
analysis has shown that the ESS in many ways became the sum of preferences of both 
the status quo and antagonist states. However, the ESS was first of all a result of 
excellent diplomatic craftsmanship by the Solana team (among them the British Robert 
                                                 
131 Thus, although the creation of the NRF was a US proposal, the NATO member states of the EU approved and even 
contributed to this force on a large scale. At the same time, some of the strongest antagonists, like Germany, were 
contributing to the NATO take over of the ISAF force in Afghanistan. 
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Cooper) who were responsible for the drafting of the text. The ability to capture the 
essence of a “moral” balance towards the US and at the same time satisfy the 
Atlanticists, was one of the ESS main achievements. The European balancing efforts 
in the ESS was a combination of smart diplomacy and realpolitik.  Even though there 
are many indications of balancing attempts with the ESDP as the “tool” of making 
balancing efforts, the American reactions to the ESS was quite positive. As the ESS 
did not focus on ESDP becoming a competitor to NATO, but instead enhance the 
ability to deploy military capabilities at the European level, the American reactions 
were quite positive as it was also a response to the US demands of Europe having the 
ability of “burden sharing”. 
The fifth and last criterion for neo-realistic assumptions to be viable is the execution 
and deployment of EU-led military operations as a reaction to the new American 
foreign and security policy. The Berlin plus agreement was a precondition for the EU’s 
ability to execute the operations and the finalising of the agreement happened in a time 
period of strong transatlantic tensions. In the winter/spring of 2003 the transatlantic 
relationship was at its worst with the NATO crisis in February, the Iraq invasion in 
March and the Tervuren headquarter suggestion in April. In March the EU launched 
operation “Concordia” in Macedonia and in June the EU launched operation 
“Artemis” in DR Congo, the latter operation without using NATO assets and 
capabilities. This last example may be the strongest indication of a balancing attempt 
from the EU.  
The analysis has shown that the incidents on 9/11 became a trigger for the change in 
US foreign and security policy and the Iraq crisis became the catalyser for the 
European effort to change and strengthen the ESDP. The ESS is the foremost marker 
in trying to show that the EU is balancing the US. However, the EU is far behind 
reaching equilibrium with the US. Nevertheless, the attempt to construct military 
capabilities within the framework of ESDP is at least an effort to fix the capability-gap 
between soft power and hard power tools in the EU, making it more credible to use 
hard power tools in a conflict situation in the future without having to call on the US 
for help. It is important to emphasise that a comparison between the EU and the US 
only makes sense if the EU is meant to do the same as the US (Ulriksen & 
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Rieker:2003:12). The effort to power balance the US through enhancing the role of 
ESDP was first of all an attempt to tip the scales and to meet the aggressive intentions 
of the superpower. It was not to make the EU into a superpower. The ESDP changes 
after 9/11 constituted more or less a normative and ideological balance towards the US 
at the same time as it was an attempt of balancing a hegemon which had lost its novel 
features. The importance of the balancing efforts was not to tip the scales in a sense 
where the US perceived the EU as a threat, but in a way where the ESDP could unite 
both the status quo and antagonist states and maintain the ESDP as a forum for 
common preferences among the member states in the subsystem.  
 
It is an established fact that neo-realism fails both to explain the dynamics of the 
integration process in the EU and the two-level game as important factors to 
understand international relations, and I have in this analysis (only briefly about the 
two-level game) showed that they are. It is probably fair to claim that neo-realism is 
fruitful, but insufficient in rationalising the reasons for change in ESDP, or as 
Mastanduno (1997:51) says it: “Realists are hardly in a position to declare victory 
and go home”. The explanatory power of the theory is only valid on the case of ESDP 
after 9/11 when we modify the Waltzian ideas of balance of power to include balance 
of threat theory and at the same time we have to see the EU as a subsystem where 
hierarchy, not anarchy, exists among the states. This modification might make neo-
realism more useful as a theory of international relations in the future when EU and 
the US are being compared. 
Balance of power/balance of threat theory gives a very good contribution on how to 
explain the changes in ESDP, but it cannot explain all the reasons why ESDP is 
changing. To what extent can institutional theory explain this change? 
An important part of the reason why the integration process has moved from less 
intergovernmental to more supranational has been the path dependent 
institutionalisation of process. The analysis has shown that there are some indications 
supporting this view. The changes in ESDP after 9/11 were the result of the path 
dependent process and the internal dynamics of spill-over first from Maastricht and 
later from St Malo. US foreign policy after 9/11 had little effect on this historical 
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process. The IGC’s before Amsterdam and Nice were influenced and constrained by 
the former treaties and decisions made at an earlier stage. The Commission played the 
role as a political entrepreneur initiating most changes within CFSP/ESDP. On the 
contrary, there are also evidence that it was shift in member state preferences 
influenced by external factors which first and foremost initialised the process. Still, the 
basis for the enhancement of military capabilities within the EU instead of finding 
bilateral, multilateral or using NATO solutions might indicate a path dependent 
influence from previous decisions in the EU.  
The process of ESDP after St Malo and especially after the decision to construct ESDP 
institutions in Cologne and Helsinki can be seen as a functional spill-over effect. This 
effect combined with the constraints of past decisions and the role of ESDP 
institutions to do the coordination created the possibility to deploy military operations, 
and very much contributed to the possibility of creating an environment for future 
enhancements. The evidence of the analysis has shown that the take over of SFOR in 
BiH was very much a result of such a process. The Helsinki HG made the 
establishment of military capabilities irreversible as it made premises for the future 
creation of the ESDP. The enlargement process made unintended consequences by 
creating a political spill-over effect to the policy areas of security and defence, among 
others, contributing to the necessity of having a security strategy for the enlargement 
of the Union.  
Looking back at the expected empirical findings from the methodological reflections 
in chapter two, it seems that the analysis has shown several indicators that verify 
institutional theory and several indicators of the opposite. It seems that institutions 
matter, but not all the time and in every situations. It seems that path dependency and 
spill-over are valuable concepts of apprehending special dynamics of the integration 
process which cannot be explained by external factors, change in member state 
preferences or change in the international structure. According to historical 
institutionalists it is not possible to create a “snapshot” of a case in time and expect it 
not to be influenced by the historical process. Therefore it is argued that the process of 
integration must be studied over time. On the other hand, one of the main arguments to 
dismiss this theory is that path dependency is often very difficult to measure. It is not 
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easy to find concrete empirical evidence that there has been an incremental and 
institutional process as a basis for the development. Thus, the methodological 
challenge is to prove that some specific details in the development of ESDP would 
have been different if the contextual and institutional setting would have been 
otherwise. However, the findings in this analysis have shown that once certain 
decisions are made, i.e. the decision to create military capabilities for the EU, the 
process, so far, has become more or less irreversible. Yet, the French and Dutch 
rejection of the Constitution in referendums in May/June 2005 shows how 
unpredictable, undetermined and fragile the integration process is. The path 
dependence and institutionalisation do not make the decision makers slaves of the past 
and it is unwise to make universal predictions about irreversibility. However, the 
fruitfulness of institutional theory is its explanatory power which becomes a 
supplemental contribution to rational theories of nation state control of the integration 
process. It explains that the European military integration within ESDP is not only the 
result of the nation states maximising their interests through cooperation, but also as a 
result of the unpredictable, unforeseen and often unintended consequences of past 
decisions and the importance of the institutions and their supranational actors woven 
together creating a spill-over effect. 
 
There are several other approaches that could have been used to answer the research 
question or questions about the development of the ESDP. I have in the theory chapter 
illuminated why I did not choose LI as a theory for this research. Undoubtedly, the 
result of the analysis would have been different if I had used LI as a theoretical 
framework instead of neo-realism. The importance of external factors and shocks has 
been discussed as an alternative approach to institutional theory. To elaborate the 
importance of these external factors, more than just using them as examples on other 
influential variables, would need an extended use of theories to explain the 
mechanisms that make member state change their preferences and allow the 
establishment of military capabilities at the EU level. In this sense the evolving 
“Europeanisation” of identity among the actors and the institutions both at the EU 
level and the nation state level can explain how and why there is a change in ESDP 
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after 9/11. In some cases the politics of identity might provide a good understanding of 
when other states in the system are viewed as a threat to states’ security and when the 
actors of the process change their identity and for what reason. These issues need 
perhaps other hypotheses which can guide the research in a different direction. This 
direction would most likely also have different conclusions than the ones presented 
here. 
The main conclusion of this thesis is that the change in ESDP after 9/11 is a product of 
the European attempt to power balance the US and it is also a result of the internal 
dynamics of the integration process. The evidence neither fully supports nor fully 
refutes either one of the theories. There is no basis to claim that the change in ESDP is 
only a result of European response to the change in US foreign and security policy. On 
the other hand, claiming that the change is solely a result of the integration process, 
where the role of institutions, spill over and path dependency work are fundamental, 
equally neglects supplementary explanatory factors. Neo-realism and institutional 
theory presented here complement each other, yet, there are still gaps that need to be 
filled to find all variables that can explain the change. However, there seem to be an 
obvious correlation of the development of the EU and the lack of theories that can 
explain this development as the EU is not a rational unitary actor, not an international 
organisation and not a state. Many times, the EU evolves in a way where the theories 
constructed to explain parts of the integration process are falsified at the next junction. 
This is one of the major future challenges for theory elaboration about the 
development of the EU. The complexity and the special dynamics of the EU where it 
distinguishes between intergovernmental and supranational decision making makes it 
even more difficult to use a theoretical framework often because one has to analyse the 
reason for change on several different levels.  
The result of this analysis suggest further testing of balance of power/balance of threat 
theory and it also suggest further testing of institutional theory to explain both the 
evolution of the ESDP and how the EU functions as an international actor. Perhaps it 
is possible to construct a theory which can cover both these levels. Then again, the 
unpredictable evolution of the EU in the future might pave the way for different 
avenues, different approaches as to how the EU should be perceived. 
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